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HomeAssistantVS/custom_components/ha_mcp_tools/__init__.py
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"""HA MCP Tools - Custom component for ha-mcp server.
Provides services that are not available through standard Home Assistant APIs,
enabling AI assistants to perform advanced operations like file management.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import difflib
import errno
import fnmatch
import hashlib
import logging
import os
import posixpath
import re
import secrets
import shutil
from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
from datetime import datetime
from io import StringIO
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
from typing import Any
import voluptuous as vol
import yaml # type: ignore[import-untyped]
from homeassistant.components import persistent_notification
from homeassistant.config import async_check_ha_config_file
from homeassistant.config_entries import ConfigEntry
from homeassistant.core import (
HomeAssistant,
ServiceCall,
ServiceResponse,
SupportsResponse,
)
from homeassistant.helpers import config_validation as cv
from homeassistant.helpers import device_registry as dr
from homeassistant.helpers.storage import Store
from homeassistant.loader import async_get_integration
from ruamel.yaml import YAMLError
from .const import (
ALLOWED_READ_DIRS,
ALLOWED_VOLUME_ROOTS,
ALLOWED_WRITE_DIRS,
ALLOWED_YAML_CONFIG_FILES,
ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS,
COMPONENT_VERSION,
CONF_ENTRY_TYPE,
DASHBOARD_URL_PATH_PATTERN,
DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS,
DENY_READ_BASENAMES,
DOMAIN,
ENTRY_TYPE_SERVER,
ENTRY_TYPE_TOOLS,
PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS,
RESERVED_DASHBOARD_URL_PATHS,
TOOLS_ENTRY_LEGACY_TITLE,
TOOLS_ENTRY_TITLE,
YAML_KEY_DEFAULT_POST_ACTION,
YAML_KEY_DENYLIST,
YAML_KEY_POST_ACTIONS,
)
from .websocket_api import async_register_commands
from .yaml_rt import (
apply_seq_indent,
detect_seq_indent,
make_yaml,
yaml_dumps,
yaml_jsonify,
)
_LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Service names
SERVICE_LIST_FILES = "list_files"
SERVICE_READ_FILE = "read_file"
SERVICE_WRITE_FILE = "write_file"
SERVICE_DELETE_FILE = "delete_file"
SERVICE_EDIT_YAML_CONFIG = "edit_yaml_config"
SERVICE_GET_CALLER_TOKEN = "get_caller_token"
SERVICE_GET_ALLOWED_PATHS = "get_allowed_paths"
SERVICE_SET_ALLOWED_PATHS = "set_allowed_paths"
SERVICE_GET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS = "get_extra_yaml_keys"
SERVICE_SET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS = "set_extra_yaml_keys"
# Read-only access to pre-#1579 YAML backups in .ha_mcp_tools_backups/, so the
# shared edits-backup interface can list/view/diff/restore them (#1579). These
# historical artifacts predate the fold into the shared store; new writes no
# longer land here.
SERVICE_LIST_LEGACY_BACKUPS = "list_legacy_backups"
SERVICE_READ_LEGACY_BACKUP = "read_legacy_backup"
# Caller-token auth (PR: restrict ha_mcp_tools.* to ha-mcp callers).
# ha-mcp injects this field in every service-call payload; non-ha-mcp callers
# (HA UI, automations, other integrations, the ha_call_service LLM bypass)
# omit it and are rejected with a structured unauthorized response.
CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD = "_ha_mcp_token"
_TOKEN_STORAGE_KEY = f"{DOMAIN}_auth"
_TOKEN_STORAGE_VERSION = 1
_HASS_DATA_TOKEN_KEY = "caller_token"
# User-configurable extra read/write directories (issue #1567). Persisted in a
# SEPARATE Store from the caller token so a corrupt/edited allowlist can never
# affect token bootstrap, and the security credential is never mixed with user
# config. Loaded into hass.data at setup and updated in place by
# set_allowed_paths so enforcement picks up changes with no HA restart.
_ALLOWED_PATHS_STORAGE_KEY = f"{DOMAIN}_allowed_paths"
_ALLOWED_PATHS_STORAGE_VERSION = 1
_HASS_DATA_ALLOWED_PATHS_KEY = "allowed_paths"
# User-configurable extra YAML write keys (#1887). Same store-per-concern
# rationale as the allowed paths above: a separate Store, loaded into hass.data
# at setup and updated in place by set_extra_yaml_keys so enforcement picks up
# changes with no HA restart. This is the component-owned half of the setting;
# the ha-mcp server also carries its own HA_MCP_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS, and the
# effective write allowlist is the union of the two (the server reads this store
# via get_extra_yaml_keys). YAML_KEY_DENYLIST members are stripped on the way in
# and re-checked at enforcement, so the store can never widen the deny floor.
_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_STORAGE_KEY = f"{DOMAIN}_extra_yaml_keys"
_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_STORAGE_VERSION = 1
_HASS_DATA_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_KEY = "extra_yaml_keys"
# Service schemas
SERVICE_EDIT_YAML_CONFIG_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Required("file"): cv.string,
vol.Required("action"): vol.In(["add", "replace", "remove", "replace_file"]),
vol.Required("yaml_path"): cv.string,
vol.Optional("content"): cv.string,
# Back-compat shim: the component reaches users via HACS ahead of the
# server, so a 0.10.0 component runs against the prior stable server
# until that server's next release. Pre-7.9.0 servers still send
# "backup": true on every edit_yaml_config call; this strict
# (PREVENT_EXTRA) schema would reject it ("extra keys not allowed")
# and break ha_config_set_yaml for everyone in that window. Accept and
# ignore it. Removable once the minimum supported server is >= 7.9.0.
vol.Optional("backup"): cv.boolean,
# Caller-provided list of PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS that the
# caller wants the component to reject. Empty list (the
# default) means no extra restrictions on top of the
# component's existing allowlist. ha-mcp populates this from
# its per-key Settings flags so the wrapper and the component
# stay symmetric — if ha-mcp's flag is off, the component also
# refuses, defending against bypass attempts.
vol.Optional("disabled_packages_keys", default=list): vol.All(
cv.ensure_list, [cv.string]
),
# Caller-provided extra top-level keys the operator has opted into
# on top of ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS (#1887). Additive only: the handler
# filters YAML_KEY_DENYLIST out before use, so a caller cannot
# unlock a trust-boundary key by sending it here. Empty list (the
# default) means the built-in allowlist applies unchanged, which
# is also what a caller that predates this field produces.
vol.Optional("extra_allowed_keys", default=list): vol.All(
cv.ensure_list, [cv.string]
),
# Two-step preview/confirm flow (#1720). Both optional with
# old-behavior defaults so a pre-confirm-flow server (which never
# sends them) still gets an immediate write.
vol.Optional("require_confirm", default=False): cv.boolean,
vol.Optional("confirm_token"): cv.string,
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_LIST_FILES_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Required("path"): cv.string,
vol.Optional("pattern"): cv.string,
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_READ_FILE_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Required("path"): cv.string,
vol.Optional("tail_lines"): vol.Coerce(int),
# When set, also return the round-trip text of the YAML subtree at this
# dotted path under ``subtree`` (used by ha-mcp's per-edit auto-backup
# to snapshot the prior value before ha_config_set_yaml edits it, #1579).
vol.Optional("yaml_path"): cv.string,
# With ``yaml_path``, also return that subtree as JSON-safe parsed data
# under ``parsed`` (ha_config_get_yaml's include_parsed, #1788). HA tags
# are rendered to source form, never resolved.
vol.Optional("include_parsed", default=False): cv.boolean,
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_WRITE_FILE_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Required("path"): cv.string,
vol.Required("content"): cv.string,
vol.Optional("overwrite", default=False): cv.boolean,
vol.Optional("create_dirs", default=True): cv.boolean,
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_DELETE_FILE_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Required("path"): cv.string,
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
# get_caller_token is the bootstrap surface: ha-mcp does not know the token
# yet on first run, so this service intentionally does NOT require the token
# itself. HA's default admin-auth still applies to the service call.
SERVICE_GET_CALLER_TOKEN_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
# get_allowed_paths / set_allowed_paths back the ha-mcp settings UI's custom
# filesystem-directory editor (issues #1567, #1586). Both are caller-token +
# admin gated. set_allowed_paths receives the FULL replacement list (mirrors how
# disabled_packages_keys sends the whole set each call); the handler validates
# and drops any entry that hits the deny floor, or that escapes the config dir
# without being one of the fixed HAOS sibling-volume roots (#1586).
SERVICE_GET_ALLOWED_PATHS_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_SET_ALLOWED_PATHS_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Optional("paths", default=list): vol.All(cv.ensure_list, [cv.string]),
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
# get_extra_yaml_keys / set_extra_yaml_keys back the component's own options
# flow and the ha-mcp settings UI (#1887). Both are caller-token + admin gated,
# matching the allowed-paths pair. set_extra_yaml_keys receives the FULL
# replacement list; the handler strips whitespace/empties and drops any
# YAML_KEY_DENYLIST member, reporting drops in ``rejected``.
SERVICE_GET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_SET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Optional("keys", default=list): vol.All(cv.ensure_list, [cv.string]),
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_LIST_LEGACY_BACKUPS_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
SERVICE_READ_LEGACY_BACKUP_SCHEMA = vol.Schema(
{
vol.Required("filename"): cv.string,
vol.Optional(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD): cv.string,
}
)
# Files that are allowed to be read (even if not in ALLOWED_READ_DIRS)
ALLOWED_READ_FILES = [
"configuration.yaml",
"automations.yaml",
"scripts.yaml",
"scenes.yaml",
"secrets.yaml",
"home-assistant.log",
]
# Default tail lines for log files
DEFAULT_LOG_TAIL_LINES = 1000
async def _load_or_create_caller_token(hass: HomeAssistant) -> str:
"""Return the persisted caller token, generating + saving one on first use.
The token authorizes a caller as ha-mcp. It's stored under
``.storage/ha_mcp_tools_auth`` and remains stable across restarts so the
ha-mcp server can re-bootstrap without user intervention.
A corrupt/unreadable store must NOT propagate out of async_setup_entry and
take down the integration: on a load failure we log and fall through to
generating a fresh token (same path as first run), overwriting the bad
blob. ha-mcp transparently re-bootstraps the new token via its
unauthorized-retry, so the only cost is a one-time token rotation.
"""
store: Store = Store(hass, _TOKEN_STORAGE_VERSION, _TOKEN_STORAGE_KEY)
try:
data = await store.async_load()
except Exception:
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools: could not load the caller-token store; generating a "
"fresh token and overwriting it.",
exc_info=True,
)
data = None
if isinstance(data, dict):
existing = data.get("token")
if isinstance(existing, str) and existing:
return existing
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
await store.async_save({"token": token})
return token
async def _load_allowed_paths(hass: HomeAssistant) -> list[str]:
"""Return the persisted user-configurable extra directories.
Each stored entry is re-validated through :func:`_normalize_extra_dir`, so a
hand-edited or corrupted store can never load a traversal / deny-floor /
out-of-config entry into ``hass.data`` (defense in depth — the deny floor is
also re-checked at enforcement time). Anything dropped is logged so a
"my custom directories disappeared" case is one grep away. Empty list on
first run or a malformed store — fail safe to "no extra access" rather than
raising, mirroring :func:`_load_or_create_caller_token`.
"""
store: Store = Store(
hass, _ALLOWED_PATHS_STORAGE_VERSION, _ALLOWED_PATHS_STORAGE_KEY
)
try:
data = await store.async_load()
except Exception:
# Honour the documented fail-safe contract: a corrupt/unreadable
# allowed-paths blob must NOT propagate out of async_setup_entry and
# take down the integration. Log loudly and fall back to no extra
# access.
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools: could not load the allowed-paths store; ignoring it "
"and granting no extra directories.",
exc_info=True,
)
return []
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return []
raw = data.get("paths")
if not isinstance(raw, list):
if raw is not None:
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools allowed-paths store is malformed (paths is %s, "
"expected list); ignoring it.",
type(raw).__name__,
)
return []
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
normalized: list[str] = []
dropped: list[Any] = []
for entry in raw:
norm = (
_normalize_extra_dir(entry, config_dir) if isinstance(entry, str) else None
)
if norm is None:
dropped.append(entry)
elif norm not in normalized:
normalized.append(norm)
if dropped:
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools: dropped %d invalid entr%s from the persisted "
"allowed-paths store: %r",
len(dropped),
"y" if len(dropped) == 1 else "ies",
dropped,
)
return normalized
async def _save_allowed_paths(hass: HomeAssistant, paths: list[str]) -> None:
"""Persist the user-configurable extra directories to .storage."""
store: Store = Store(
hass, _ALLOWED_PATHS_STORAGE_VERSION, _ALLOWED_PATHS_STORAGE_KEY
)
await store.async_save({"paths": paths})
def _normalize_extra_yaml_keys(raw: Any) -> tuple[list[str], list[Any]]:
"""Clean a candidate extra-YAML-keys list into ``(kept, dropped)`` (#1887).
Mirrors the server's ``parse_extra_yaml_write_keys`` (strip whitespace, drop
empties, dedup, sort) and additionally drops any ``YAML_KEY_DENYLIST``
member, so the component store can never widen the deny floor. Non-string
and blank entries are dropped too. ``dropped`` collects every rejected
entry for reporting/logging. Case is preserved: HA's own top-level domain
lookup is exact-case, so a mis-cased key never reaches a real integration.
"""
kept: list[str] = []
dropped: list[Any] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for entry in raw if isinstance(raw, list) else []:
if not isinstance(entry, str):
dropped.append(entry)
continue
key = entry.strip()
if not key or key in YAML_KEY_DENYLIST:
dropped.append(entry)
continue
if key not in seen:
seen.add(key)
kept.append(key)
return sorted(kept), dropped
async def _load_extra_yaml_keys(hass: HomeAssistant) -> list[str]:
"""Return the persisted user-configurable extra YAML write keys (#1887).
Fail-safe like :func:`_load_allowed_paths`: a corrupt/unreadable or
hand-edited store never propagates out of ``async_setup_entry``. Every entry
is re-validated through :func:`_normalize_extra_yaml_keys`, so a denylisted
or malformed key can never load into ``hass.data`` (defense in depth - the
deny floor is also re-checked at enforcement). Empty list on first run or a
malformed store.
"""
store: Store = Store(
hass, _EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_STORAGE_VERSION, _EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_STORAGE_KEY
)
try:
data = await store.async_load()
except Exception:
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools: could not load the extra-YAML-keys store; ignoring "
"it and granting no extra write keys.",
exc_info=True,
)
return []
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return []
raw = data.get("keys")
if raw is not None and not isinstance(raw, list):
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools extra-YAML-keys store is malformed (keys is %s, "
"expected list); ignoring it.",
type(raw).__name__,
)
return []
kept, dropped = _normalize_extra_yaml_keys(raw)
if dropped:
_LOGGER.warning(
"ha_mcp_tools: dropped %d invalid entr%s from the persisted "
"extra-YAML-keys store: %r",
len(dropped),
"y" if len(dropped) == 1 else "ies",
dropped,
)
return kept
async def _save_extra_yaml_keys(hass: HomeAssistant, keys: list[str]) -> None:
"""Persist the user-configurable extra YAML write keys to .storage."""
store: Store = Store(
hass, _EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_STORAGE_VERSION, _EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_STORAGE_KEY
)
await store.async_save({"keys": keys})
async def _apply_allowed_paths(
hass: HomeAssistant, raw_paths: Any
) -> tuple[list[str], list[Any]]:
"""Normalize, persist, and hot-swap the extra directories (#1567, #1887).
Shared by the ``set_allowed_paths`` service and the tools-entry options flow
so both edit the store through one validated path. Each entry runs through
:func:`_normalize_extra_dir`; traversal / out-of-config / deny-floor entries
are dropped into ``rejected``. Persists to .storage and updates hass.data so
enforcement applies live. Returns ``(kept, rejected)``.
"""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
normalized: list[str] = []
rejected: list[Any] = []
for entry in raw_paths if isinstance(raw_paths, list) else []:
norm = (
_normalize_extra_dir(entry, config_dir) if isinstance(entry, str) else None
)
if norm is None:
rejected.append(entry)
elif norm not in normalized:
normalized.append(norm)
await _save_allowed_paths(hass, normalized)
hass.data.setdefault(DOMAIN, {})[_HASS_DATA_ALLOWED_PATHS_KEY] = normalized
return normalized, rejected
async def _apply_extra_yaml_keys(
hass: HomeAssistant, raw_keys: Any
) -> tuple[list[str], list[Any]]:
"""Normalize, persist, and hot-swap the extra YAML write keys (#1887).
Shared by the ``set_extra_yaml_keys`` service and the tools-entry options
flow. Delegates validation to :func:`_normalize_extra_yaml_keys` (strip,
dedup, sort, drop denylist). Persists to .storage and updates hass.data so
enforcement applies live. Returns ``(kept, rejected)``.
"""
normalized, rejected = _normalize_extra_yaml_keys(raw_keys)
await _save_extra_yaml_keys(hass, normalized)
hass.data.setdefault(DOMAIN, {})[_HASS_DATA_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_KEY] = normalized
return normalized, rejected
def _unified_diff(before: str, after: str, rel_path: str, max_lines: int = 200) -> str:
"""Unified diff of a prospective write, capped for response size."""
lines = list(
difflib.unified_diff(
before.splitlines(keepends=True),
after.splitlines(keepends=True),
fromfile=f"{rel_path} (before)",
tofile=f"{rel_path} (after)",
)
)
if len(lines) > max_lines:
omitted = len(lines) - max_lines
lines = lines[:max_lines] + [f"... diff truncated ({omitted} more lines)\n"]
return "".join(lines)
def _confirm_token(normalized: str, new_content: str) -> str:
"""Stateless confirm token: hash of target path + exact bytes to write.
Re-derived on the confirm call from CURRENT disk state, so any change
to the file between preview and confirm invalidates the token
(optimistic locking, same philosophy as utils/config_hash.py).
"""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{normalized}\n{new_content}".encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
def _count_reindented_lines(diff_text: str) -> int:
"""Count untouched lines that only changed leading whitespace.
A ``-``/``+`` pair whose stripped bodies match is a pure re-indent —
collateral from normalizing a mixed-style file to one sequence style
(ruamel supports a single style per dump). Multiset matching so
repeated identical lines don't over-count.
"""
removed: dict[str, int] = {}
added: dict[str, int] = {}
for line in diff_text.splitlines():
if line.startswith("---") or line.startswith("+++"):
continue
if line.startswith("-"):
body = line[1:]
removed[body.strip()] = removed.get(body.strip(), 0) + 1
elif line.startswith("+"):
body = line[1:]
added[body.strip()] = added.get(body.strip(), 0) + 1
return sum(min(n, added.get(key, 0)) for key, n in removed.items() if key)
def _reindent_warning(count: int) -> str:
"""Warning text for re-indented untouched lines (see ``diff``)."""
return (
f"{count} line(s) outside the requested edit were re-indented: the "
"file mixes sequence-indent styles and the serializer normalizes to "
"the first-detected style. Values are unchanged (guarded); review "
"the diff if the whitespace matters."
)
def _unauthorized_response(service_name: str, **extra: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Structured 'unauthorized' response.
ha-mcp clients detect this via ``error_code == "unauthorized"`` and
re-fetch the token before retrying.
"""
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Unauthorized: caller token missing or invalid for "
f"{DOMAIN}.{service_name}. This service is restricted to the "
"ha-mcp server; other callers should not invoke it directly."
),
"error_code": "unauthorized",
**extra,
}
def _caller_token_ok(hass: HomeAssistant, call: ServiceCall) -> bool:
"""Return True if the caller presented the configured token."""
domain_data = hass.data.get(DOMAIN)
expected = (
domain_data.get(_HASS_DATA_TOKEN_KEY) if isinstance(domain_data, dict) else None
)
presented = call.data.get(CALLER_TOKEN_FIELD)
# token_urlsafe(32) is 256-bit; the timing-side-channel risk is already
# negligible, but secrets.compare_digest is the right reflex regardless.
if not isinstance(expected, str) or not isinstance(presented, str):
return False
return secrets.compare_digest(expected, presented)
async def _caller_is_admin(hass: HomeAssistant, call: ServiceCall) -> bool:
"""Return True if the caller is an admin user (or a no-user-context call).
HA's service registry has no built-in admin requirement — `Service`
has no admin flag, `async_call` performs no permission check, and
WS / REST `call_service` lack `@require_admin`. Gate explicitly here.
Calls without `context.user_id` (system-internal events) are treated
as trusted, matching HA's `async_admin_handler_factory` convention.
The supported deployment shapes all use admin tokens: addon's
SUPERVISOR_TOKEN maps to HA's `hassio_user`, which HA force-promotes
into `GROUP_ID_ADMIN` (hassio/__init__.py); standalone Docker/pip
deployments use a user-supplied admin LLAT.
"""
if not call.context.user_id:
return True
user = await hass.auth.async_get_user(call.context.user_id)
return user is not None and bool(user.is_admin)
def _is_within_config_dir(config_dir: Path, normalized: str) -> bool:
"""Resolve ``config_dir / normalized`` and confirm it stays within
``config_dir`` (symlink-aware).
Uses ``Path.is_relative_to`` rather than a string prefix so a sibling like
``<config>-evil`` can't masquerade as being inside the config dir. Fails
closed on any resolution error.
"""
try:
resolved = (config_dir / normalized).resolve()
config_resolved = config_dir.resolve()
except (OSError, ValueError):
return False
return resolved == config_resolved or resolved.is_relative_to(config_resolved)
def _violates_deny_floor(config_dir: Path, normalized: str) -> bool:
"""True if ``normalized`` (a ``normpath``'d, config-relative path) hits the
non-overridable deny floor (issue #1567).
Checked BEFORE any allow decision on every read/write/list/delete, so a
user-configured extra directory — whether stored or supplied in-flight —
can never reach these locations. See ``const.DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS`` /
``const.DENY_READ_BASENAMES`` for the rationale.
"""
# All comparisons are case-insensitive: on a case-insensitive filesystem
# (macOS APFS, some Docker bind mounts / SMB) ".STORAGE" opens the real
# ".storage", so an exact-case match would let a mixed-case entry slip
# through. The deny sets are already lowercase, so lowering the input is
# enough. This only ever denies MORE — no legitimate path is a case-variant
# of ".storage"/"secrets.yaml".
parts = [p for p in normalized.split(os.sep) if p]
# A .storage segment anywhere in the relative path (".storage",
# ".storage/auth", "x/.storage/y").
if any(p.lower() in DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS for p in parts):
return True
# Symlink defence: resolve and reject if the real target passes THROUGH a
# denied segment (e.g. an in-config symlink pointing at .storage). Scan ONLY
# the portion of the resolved path that is *under the config dir* — not the
# full absolute path — so the floor doesn't blanket-ban every access when the
# config dir itself happens to live below a ".storage" component (e.g.
# ``/var/.storage/config``). This mirrors the pre-PR allowlist model, which
# likewise only ever reasons about the config-relative path. ``relative_to``
# raising ValueError means the resolved target escaped the config dir (e.g. a
# symlink out) — fail closed. Fail closed on any resolution error too.
try:
resolved = (config_dir / normalized).resolve()
rel_parts = resolved.relative_to(config_dir.resolve()).parts
except (OSError, ValueError):
return True
if any(seg.lower() in DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS for seg in rel_parts):
return True
# secrets.yaml — by basename of BOTH the requested path AND the resolved
# target, so a renamed symlink (``www/notes.txt`` → ``secrets.yaml``) can't
# dodge it and then escape masking (the read handler masks only the literal
# ``secrets.yaml``). The canonical config-root file is the one exception,
# matched EXACTLY (not lowercased) because that is the only path the handler
# masks — a mixed-case ``SECRETS.YAML`` at the root is NOT masked, so it
# must be denied.
return (
os.path.basename(normalized).lower() in DENY_READ_BASENAMES
or resolved.name.lower() in DENY_READ_BASENAMES
) and normalized != "secrets.yaml"
def _volume_root_for(abs_path: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the HAOS sibling-volume root (``const.ALLOWED_VOLUME_ROOTS``) that
``abs_path`` falls within, or ``None`` (issue #1586).
Boundary-aware on a path-separator: ``/share`` and ``/share/x`` match
``/share``; ``/shared`` and ``/backups`` do NOT (a string-prefix match would
wrongly admit them). ``abs_path`` must already be ``posixpath.normpath``'d —
the volume roots are inherently POSIX and the component only runs on HA Core
(Linux), so we never use the host ``os.sep`` here.
"""
for root in ALLOWED_VOLUME_ROOTS:
if abs_path == root or abs_path.startswith(root + "/"):
return root
return None
def _resolves_within(base: Path, raw_path: str) -> bool:
"""Resolve ``raw_path`` exactly as ``open(2)`` will — following symlinks,
THEN applying ``..`` against the real target — and confirm it stays within
``base`` (symlink-safe containment; issue #1586 review).
The lexical allow checks run on ``os.path.normpath(raw_path)``, which
collapses ``..`` *textually* and so erases an intermediate symlink component
(``<allowed>/<symlink>/..``) that the kernel would actually traverse at open
time — the divergence that let a configured volume reach arbitrary files.
Resolving the RAW input (not the normpath-collapsed form) closes it, because
the handlers open ``config_dir / raw_path`` and the OS resolves it the same
way ``Path.resolve()`` does. Fails closed on any resolution error.
"""
try:
candidate = Path(raw_path) if raw_path.startswith("/") else base / raw_path
real = candidate.resolve()
base_real = base.resolve()
except (OSError, ValueError):
return False
return real == base_real or real.is_relative_to(base_real)
def _violates_volume_deny_floor(abs_path: str) -> bool:
"""True if an absolute HAOS volume path hits the non-overridable deny floor
(issue #1586).
The same floor as the config dir — a ``.storage`` segment anywhere, or a
``secrets.yaml`` basename — applied to both the requested path and its
symlink-resolved target, case-insensitively. Unlike the config dir there is
NO canonical ``secrets.yaml`` exception: volume reads are never masked, so a
``secrets.yaml`` on any volume is always denied. Fails closed on any
resolution error.
"""
req = PurePosixPath(abs_path)
if any(seg.lower() in DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS for seg in req.parts):
return True
if req.name.lower() in DENY_READ_BASENAMES:
return True
try:
resolved = Path(abs_path).resolve()
except (OSError, ValueError):
return True
if any(seg.lower() in DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS for seg in resolved.parts):
return True
return resolved.name.lower() in DENY_READ_BASENAMES
def _normalize_volume_dir(entry: str) -> str | None:
"""Validate one absolute HAOS sibling-volume directory (issue #1586).
Returns the cleaned absolute path, or ``None`` if it is not at/under a known
volume root or hits the deny floor. POSIX-normalized regardless of host OS
(the roots are inherently POSIX and the component only runs on HA Core).
Existence is NOT required (mirrors config-relative extra dirs); an unmounted
volume just yields ``not found`` at use time.
"""
normalized = posixpath.normpath(entry)
root = _volume_root_for(normalized)
if root is None:
return None
if _violates_volume_deny_floor(normalized):
return None
return normalized
def _is_volume_path_allowed(abs_path: str, extra_dirs: list[str] | None) -> bool:
"""Enforce a read/write/list/delete against an absolute HAOS volume path
(issue #1586).
Allowed iff the path is at/under a configured extra dir that is itself a
volume path, clears the deny floor, and — after FULL symlink + ``..``
resolution of the RAW path (matching ``open(2)``) — stays within its volume
root. Resolving the raw path rather than the lexically ``normpath``'d form
closes the ``<volume>/<symlink>/..`` escape (issue #1586 review). Read and
write share this gate — a configured volume grants read+write (#1567).
"""
normalized = posixpath.normpath(abs_path)
root = _volume_root_for(normalized)
if root is None:
return False
if _violates_volume_deny_floor(normalized):
return False
# POSIX-explicit allowlist match (not _matches_extra_dir, which joins on
# os.sep): a volume path is inherently "/"-separated, so match on a "/"
# boundary so a configured "/share" grants "/share" and "/share/..." but
# never "/shared". Config-relative entries in the mixed list never match an
# absolute path here.
if not extra_dirs or not any(
normalized == d or normalized.startswith(d + "/") for d in extra_dirs
):
return False
return _resolves_within(Path(root), abs_path)
def _normalize_extra_dir(entry: str, config_dir: Path) -> str | None:
"""Validate and normalize one user-supplied extra directory (issues #1567,
#1586).
Returns the cleaned directory, or ``None`` if the entry must be rejected.
Two accepted shapes:
* A config-relative directory (issue #1567) — rejected if empty, the config
root, uses ``..`` traversal, resolves outside the config dir, or hits the
deny floor.
* An absolute HAOS sibling-volume path (issue #1586) — kept absolute and
validated against its volume root (``const.ALLOWED_VOLUME_ROOTS``) instead
of the config dir. Any other absolute path is still rejected.
Rejected entries are dropped (mirrors the filter-to-known-good discipline
used for ``disabled_packages_keys``).
"""
if not isinstance(entry, str):
return None
stripped = entry.strip()
if not stripped:
return None
# Absolute HAOS sibling-volume path (issue #1586) — validated against its
# volume root, not the config dir. Detected by a POSIX-absolute leading "/"
# (not os.path.isabs, which is False for "/share" on a non-POSIX host) so the
# logic is identical on every OS the tests run on. Any non-volume absolute
# path is rejected inside _normalize_volume_dir.
if stripped.startswith("/"):
return _normalize_volume_dir(stripped)
cleaned = stripped.strip("/")
if not cleaned:
return None
normalized = os.path.normpath(cleaned)
if (
normalized in (".", "")
or normalized.startswith("..")
or normalized.startswith("/")
):
return None
if not _is_within_config_dir(config_dir, normalized):
return None
if _violates_deny_floor(config_dir, normalized):
return None
return normalized
def _matches_extra_dir(normalized: str, extra_dirs: list[str] | None) -> bool:
"""True if ``normalized`` IS one of the user-configured extra directories
or a path under one (issue #1567).
Prefix match on a path-separator boundary so a multi-segment entry like
``foo/bar`` grants ``foo/bar`` and ``foo/bar/...`` exactly as configured
(the built-in allowlists are single-segment and matched on ``parts[0]``,
but extra dirs may be nested), while ``foo`` never matches ``foobar``.
"""
if not extra_dirs:
return False
return any(normalized == d or normalized.startswith(d + os.sep) for d in extra_dirs)
class _PackagesDir(str):
"""Marker for the folder argument of a packages ``!include_dir_*named``."""
def _capture_packages_dir(loader: yaml.Loader, node: yaml.nodes.Node) -> _PackagesDir:
"""Construct a packages include-dir tag as its folder-name argument."""
return _PackagesDir(str(node.value))
def _follow_include(loader: yaml.Loader, node: yaml.nodes.Node) -> Any:
"""Follow ``!include`` so a split ``homeassistant:`` / ``packages:`` block in
another file is still seen during folder discovery (#1854 review).
Depth-guarded and best-effort: an unreadable/unparseable target (or a
string-stream loader with no base path) yields ``None``, like any other tag.
Only the referenced file's structure is read; every other HA tag inside it
is still dropped by the ignore constructor.
"""
depth = getattr(loader, "_pkg_include_depth", 0)
name = getattr(loader, "name", "")
if depth >= 8 or not isinstance(name, str) or not name or name.startswith("<"):
return None
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(name), str(node.value))
# Recorded BEFORE the open, and even when it fails: the caching layer keys
# on these files' mtimes, so an include target that does not exist yet must
# still be tracked (with a -1 stamp) or creating it later would not
# invalidate.
opened = getattr(loader, "_pkg_opened", None)
if opened is not None:
opened.append(path)
try:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
sub = _PackagesDirLoader(handle)
sub._pkg_include_depth = depth + 1
# Same list object, so a nested include lands in one signature.
sub._pkg_opened = opened
try:
return sub.get_single_data()
finally:
sub.dispose()
except (OSError, yaml.YAMLError):
return None
def _ignore_unknown_tag(
loader: yaml.Loader, tag_suffix: str, node: yaml.nodes.Node
) -> None:
"""Drop any other HA custom tag (``!secret`` / ``!env_var`` / ...).
Folder discovery only needs the ``homeassistant: packages:`` structure, so
unresolved tags are irrelevant — turning them into ``None`` lets
configuration.yaml parse structurally without resolving secrets, which is
what keeps this from being fragile hand-parsing.
"""
return None
class _PackagesDirLoader(yaml.SafeLoader):
"""SafeLoader that captures packages include-dir folder names, follows
``!include``, and ignores every other HA custom tag."""
_PackagesDirLoader.add_constructor("!include_dir_named", _capture_packages_dir)
_PackagesDirLoader.add_constructor("!include_dir_merge_named", _capture_packages_dir)
_PackagesDirLoader.add_constructor("!include", _follow_include)
_PackagesDirLoader.add_multi_constructor("!", _ignore_unknown_tag)
def _extract_package_dir_markers(data: object) -> set[str]:
"""Return the raw folder argument(s) of the packages include directive(s) in
a parsed configuration mapping. Inline packages declare no folder."""
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return set()
core = data.get("homeassistant")
if not isinstance(core, dict):
return set()
packages = core.get("packages")
markers: list[_PackagesDir] = []
if isinstance(packages, _PackagesDir):
markers.append(packages)
elif isinstance(packages, dict):
markers.extend(v for v in packages.values() if isinstance(v, _PackagesDir))
return {str(m) for m in markers}
def _load_package_dir_markers_tracked(config_path: str) -> tuple[set[str], list[str]]:
"""``_load_package_dir_markers`` that also reports every file it read.
The file list (configuration.yaml plus any ``!include`` followed from it) is
what ``_package_dir_markers_cached`` keys its mtime signature on, so the
cache invalidates no matter which of them the packages directive lives in.
"""
opened: list[str] = [config_path]
try:
with open(config_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
loader = _PackagesDirLoader(handle)
loader._pkg_opened = opened
try:
data = loader.get_single_data()
finally:
loader.dispose()
except (OSError, yaml.YAMLError):
return set(), opened
return _extract_package_dir_markers(data), opened
def _load_package_dir_markers(config_path: str) -> set[str]:
"""Parse configuration.yaml (following ``!include``) and return the raw
folder argument(s) of every packages ``!include_dir_*named`` directive.
Blocking (opens files) — call via an executor. Returns raw strings, possibly
absolute; the caller relativizes and filters them against the config dir.
"""
markers, _opened = _load_package_dir_markers_tracked(config_path)
return markers
def _mtime_sig(paths: list[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, int], ...]:
"""Stamp each path with its mtime, or -1 when it does not exist.
The -1 is load-bearing: an ``!include`` target that is missing today and
created tomorrow changes the signature, so the cache invalidates instead of
serving folder-detection that predates the file.
"""
sig: list[tuple[str, int]] = []
for path in paths:
try:
sig.append((path, os.stat(path).st_mtime_ns))
except OSError:
sig.append((path, -1))
return tuple(sig)
# config_path -> (signature of the files last read, markers found in them).
# Module-level: the folder binding is per config dir, and HA runs one per
# process. Concurrent first-callers may each miss and parse once before the
# entry lands — bounded, self-healing, and cheaper than holding a lock across
# executor threads.
_PACKAGE_DIR_CACHE: dict[str, tuple[tuple[tuple[str, int], ...], set[str]]] = {}
def _package_dir_markers_cached(config_path: str) -> set[str]:
"""``_load_package_dir_markers``, skipping the parse when nothing changed.
Blocking (stats files) — call via an executor. Every file operation resolves
the packages folder, and a ``ha_config_get_yaml`` glob fires one detection
per matched file, so this would otherwise re-parse configuration.yaml (and
whatever it includes) N times per search. Stat-per-file is cheap; the YAML
parse is not.
"""
cached = _PACKAGE_DIR_CACHE.get(config_path)
if cached is not None:
signature, markers = cached
if _mtime_sig([path for path, _ in signature]) == signature:
return set(markers)
markers, opened = _load_package_dir_markers_tracked(config_path)
# Copy in and out: the cached set must not be mutable through a caller.
_PACKAGE_DIR_CACHE[config_path] = (_mtime_sig(opened), set(markers))
return markers
def _package_folder_relative_to_config(raw: str, config_dir: str) -> str | None:
"""Normalize a captured packages-folder argument to a config-relative folder
name, or ``None`` if it escapes the config dir.
An absolute include under the config dir (``!include_dir_named
/config/integrations``) is expressed relative to it; an absolute path
elsewhere, a parent escape, or the config root itself is dropped.
"""
if raw.startswith("/"):
norm = os.path.normpath(raw)
if norm == config_dir or norm.startswith(config_dir + os.sep):
rel = os.path.relpath(norm, config_dir)
return rel if rel != "." else None
return None
folder = os.path.normpath(raw)
if folder and folder != "." and not folder.startswith(".."):
return folder
return None
async def _detect_package_dirs(hass: HomeAssistant) -> set[str]:
"""Return the config-relative folder name(s) HA loads packages from.
Home Assistant binds packages via ``homeassistant: packages:
!include_dir_named <folder>`` (or ``!include_dir_merge_named``), where
``<folder>`` is any user-chosen directory — not necessarily ``packages``
(issue #1854). The folder is read straight from that directive in
configuration.yaml (following ``!include`` for a split ``homeassistant:``
section), so it is found even when the folder is still empty (the first
package is about to be created), a nested layout resolves to the configured
include root, and an in-config absolute include is relativized.
Always includes the built-in ``"packages"`` default, and degrades to just
that if configuration.yaml can't be read.
"""
dirs = {"packages"}
config_path = hass.config.path(ALLOWED_YAML_CONFIG_FILES[0])
# normpath is a pure string transform (no I/O), so ASYNC240 doesn't apply.
config_dir = os.path.normpath(hass.config.config_dir) # noqa: ASYNC240
markers = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_package_dir_markers_cached, config_path
)
for raw in markers:
folder = _package_folder_relative_to_config(raw, config_dir)
if folder:
dirs.add(folder)
return dirs
def _path_in_package_dir(normalized: str, package_dirs: set[str] | None) -> bool:
"""True if ``normalized`` is a ``*.yaml`` file at any depth under one of the
configured package folders.
Literal folder match (not ``fnmatch``), so a folder name containing glob
metacharacters — valid on HA's Linux filesystem — is matched as the literal
include root rather than a wildcard (#1854 review).
"""
if not normalized.endswith(".yaml"):
return False
return any(
normalized.startswith(folder + "/") for folder in (package_dirs or {"packages"})
)
def _dir_in_package_dir(normalized: str, package_dirs: set[str] | None) -> bool:
"""True if ``normalized`` IS a configured package folder, or a folder under one.
The file-level twin is ``_path_in_package_dir``; this one matches the
FOLDER itself (and nested folders) so ``list_files`` can enumerate a
packages directory the way ``read_file`` can already read the ``*.yaml``
inside it (issue #1854).
Unlike ``_path_in_package_dir``, this does NOT default to ``{"packages"}``
when ``package_dirs`` is None: ``_is_path_allowed_for_dir`` is shared with
write_file and delete_file, which must never gain package access
(``edit_yaml_config`` is the only write path to config YAML). Only the
read-side lister passes ``package_dirs``.
"""
if not package_dirs:
return False
return any(
normalized == folder or normalized.startswith(folder + "/")
for folder in package_dirs
)
def _is_path_allowed_for_dir(
config_dir: Path,
rel_path: str,
allowed_dirs: list[str],
extra_dirs: list[str] | None = None,
package_dirs: set[str] | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Check if a path is within allowed directories.
``extra_dirs`` are the user-configured custom directories (issue #1567),
granted in addition to ``allowed_dirs``. The non-overridable deny floor is
checked first, so a custom directory can never grant access to ``.storage``
or other floored paths.
``package_dirs`` (issue #1854) widens ONLY the allow decision — every
containment, deny-floor and symlink check below still runs — and is passed
by the read-side lister alone; write and delete leave it None so a
packages folder stays non-writable through this helper.
"""
# Absolute HAOS sibling-volume path (issue #1586) — enforced against its
# volume root rather than the config dir. Detected by a POSIX-absolute
# leading "/" and passed RAW (not normpath'd) so symlink resolution matches
# what the handler's open() does. Any non-volume absolute path is rejected
# inside the helper.
if rel_path.startswith("/"):
return _is_volume_path_allowed(rel_path, extra_dirs)
# Normalize the path
normalized = os.path.normpath(rel_path)
# Check for path traversal attempts
if normalized.startswith("..") or normalized.startswith("/"):
return False
# NON-OVERRIDABLE deny floor — before any allow decision (issue #1567).
if _violates_deny_floor(config_dir, normalized):
return False
# Built-in allowlist matches on the first segment; user-configured extra
# dirs match on a path-boundary prefix (so nested entries work). A
# configured packages folder matches literally (it may itself be nested,
# e.g. "conf/packages", so a first-segment test would miss it).
parts = normalized.split(os.sep)
builtin_ok = bool(parts) and parts[0] in allowed_dirs
if (
not builtin_ok
and not _dir_in_package_dir(normalized, package_dirs)
and not _matches_extra_dir(normalized, extra_dirs)
):
return False
# Symlink-safe containment on the REAL path the handler will open (issue
# #1586 review): resolve the RAW rel_path — open(2) follows symlinks then
# applies "..", which the lexical normpath above cannot model — and confirm
# it stays under the config dir. Closes the `<allowed>/<symlink>/../escape`
# traversal the lexical checks miss.
if not _resolves_within(config_dir, rel_path):
return False
# Resolve full path and verify it's still under config_dir
return _is_within_config_dir(config_dir, normalized)
def _is_path_allowed_for_read(
config_dir: Path,
rel_path: str,
extra_dirs: list[str] | None = None,
package_dirs: set[str] | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Check if a path is allowed for reading.
Allowed:
- Files directly in config dir: configuration.yaml, automations.yaml, etc.
- Files in allowed directories: www/, themes/, custom_templates/,
dashboards/, blueprints/ (blueprints is read-only — issue #1965)
- Files matching patterns: <packages-folder>/*.yaml, custom_components/**/*.py
- User-configured extra directories (``extra_dirs``), granted read+write
(issue #1567)
``package_dirs`` is the set of configured packages folder name(s) (issue
#1854); it defaults to ``{"packages"}`` when not supplied so callers that
don't resolve the live config keep the historical behaviour.
The non-overridable deny floor is checked first, so a custom directory can
never reach ``.storage`` or an unmasked ``secrets.yaml``.
"""
# Absolute HAOS sibling-volume path (issue #1586) — enforced against its
# volume root rather than the config dir. Detected by a POSIX-absolute
# leading "/" and passed RAW so symlink resolution matches the handler's
# open(). A configured volume grants read too, so reads route through the
# same gate as dir/write.
if rel_path.startswith("/"):
return _is_volume_path_allowed(rel_path, extra_dirs)
normalized = os.path.normpath(rel_path)
# Check for path traversal attempts
if normalized.startswith("..") or normalized.startswith("/"):
return False
# Resolve full path and verify it's still under config_dir
if not _is_within_config_dir(config_dir, normalized):
return False
# NON-OVERRIDABLE deny floor — before any allow decision (issue #1567).
if _violates_deny_floor(config_dir, normalized):
return False
# Symlink-safe containment on the REAL path the handler will open (issue
# #1586 review): resolve the RAW rel_path so a `<allowed>/<symlink>/..` that
# lexically stays inside but physically escapes is rejected.
if not _resolves_within(config_dir, rel_path):
return False
# Check if it's one of the explicitly allowed files in config root
if normalized in ALLOWED_READ_FILES:
return True
# Check if path starts with an allowed directory
parts = normalized.split(os.sep)
if parts and parts[0] in ALLOWED_READ_DIRS:
return True
# Check for <packages-folder>/*.yaml at any depth. The configured folder(s)
# default to {"packages"} (issue #1854); literal match so a folder name with
# glob metacharacters is treated as the include root, not a wildcard.
if _path_in_package_dir(normalized, package_dirs):
return True
# Check for custom_components/**/*.py pattern
if fnmatch.fnmatch(normalized, "custom_components/**/*.py"):
return True
# User-configured extra directories (read+write) — issue #1567. Prefix
# match so nested entries (e.g. "foo/bar") grant paths under them.
return _matches_extra_dir(normalized, extra_dirs)
def _mask_secrets_content(content: str) -> str:
"""Return secrets.yaml content with every secret value masked.
Parses the document structurally (ruamel — the same YAML stack used
elsewhere in this component) and emits ``key: "[MASKED]"`` for each
top-level key. This closes the gap in the previous line-by-line regex, which
masked only single-line ``key: value`` pairs and leaked multi-line block
scalars (``|``, ``>``) whose continuation lines have no colon — SSH keys,
TLS material, and service-account JSON are commonly stored that way.
The marker is quoted because the masked text is itself valid YAML that gets
re-parsed: read_file's ``yaml_path``/``include_parsed`` views load it, and
an unquoted ``[MASKED]`` is flow-sequence syntax, so the parsed view would
render the mask as the list ``["MASKED"]`` instead of a scalar.
Fails closed: any content that cannot be parsed and masked as a key-value
mapping is withheld rather than returned raw, so a failure on this path never
leaks secrets. The catch is deliberately broad — masking is a security
boundary, so every failure mode (parse error, a pathological tag constructor,
a YAML init/threading error) must withhold, not propagate to the caller with
the raw content still in scope.
"""
try:
parsed = make_yaml().load(content)
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
# Empty file (None) or a top-level list/scalar: no top-level keys to
# mask, so withhold rather than risk returning unmasked content.
return (
"# secrets.yaml is empty or not a key-value mapping — content withheld"
)
return "\n".join(f'{key}: "[MASKED]"' for key in parsed)
except YAMLError:
return "# secrets.yaml could not be parsed — content withheld to avoid leaking secrets"
except Exception:
return "# secrets.yaml could not be masked — content withheld to avoid leaking secrets"
def _validate_dashboard_filename(filename: str) -> str | None:
"""Validate a YAML-mode dashboard `filename:` value.
Returns None if valid, otherwise a human-readable error string.
Rules:
- Must be a non-empty string.
- Must end in '.yaml'.
- Must resolve to a path under 'dashboards/' (no traversal escape).
- No absolute paths, no '..' segments.
"""
if not filename or not isinstance(filename, str):
return "filename must be a non-empty string"
if filename.startswith("/"):
return "filename must not be an absolute path"
if not filename.endswith(".yaml"):
return "filename must end with .yaml"
normalized = os.path.normpath(filename)
if normalized.startswith("..") or normalized.startswith("/"):
return "filename must not escape the config directory"
parts = normalized.split(os.sep)
if not parts or parts[0] != "dashboards":
return "filename must be under dashboards/"
# Reject any '..' segment (defence-in-depth after normpath collapse)
if ".." in parts:
return "filename must not contain path traversal segments"
return None
def _list_files_sync(
target_dir: Path, config_dir: Path, pattern: str | None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Bundle list_files blocking I/O for a single executor offload.
Returns either {"files": [...]} or {"_error": <kind>} so the async caller
can format the structured error response without re-entering the executor.
"""
if not target_dir.exists():
return {"_error": "not_found"}
if not target_dir.is_dir():
return {"_error": "not_a_dir"}
files: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in target_dir.iterdir():
if pattern and not fnmatch.fnmatch(item.name, pattern):
continue
stat = item.stat()
# Config-relative paths report relative to the config dir; absolute
# HAOS sibling-volume paths (issue #1586) are not under it, so report
# them absolute (the caller passes absolute paths for volumes too).
try:
reported_path = str(item.relative_to(config_dir))
except ValueError:
reported_path = str(item)
files.append(
{
"name": item.name,
"path": reported_path,
"is_dir": item.is_dir(),
"size": stat.st_size if item.is_file() else 0,
"modified": stat.st_mtime,
}
)
files.sort(key=lambda x: (not x["is_dir"], x["name"].lower()))
return {"files": files}
def _read_file_sync(target_file: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Bundle read_file blocking I/O for a single executor offload."""
if not target_file.exists():
return {"_error": "not_found"}
if not target_file.is_file():
return {"_error": "not_a_file"}
stat = target_file.stat()
content = target_file.read_text()
return {"content": content, "size": stat.st_size, "mtime": stat.st_mtime}
def _write_file_sync(
target_file: Path,
content: str,
overwrite: bool,
create_dirs: bool,
config_dir: Path,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Bundle write_file blocking I/O for a single executor offload."""
exists = target_file.exists()
if exists and not overwrite:
return {"_error": "exists_no_overwrite"}
if create_dirs:
target_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
elif not target_file.parent.exists():
# Config-relative parents report relative to the config dir; an absolute
# HAOS sibling-volume parent (issue #1586) is not under it, so report it
# absolute rather than raising ValueError on relative_to.
try:
parent = str(target_file.parent.relative_to(config_dir))
except ValueError:
parent = str(target_file.parent)
return {
"_error": "no_parent",
"parent": parent,
}
target_file.write_text(content)
stat = target_file.stat()
return {"size": stat.st_size, "mtime": stat.st_mtime, "is_new": not exists}
def _delete_file_sync(target_file: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Bundle delete_file blocking I/O for a single executor offload."""
if not target_file.exists():
return {"_error": "not_found"}
if not target_file.is_file():
return {"_error": "not_a_file"}
stat = target_file.stat()
target_file.unlink()
return {"size": stat.st_size}
def _replace_file_sync(target_file: Path, content: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Bundle whole-file replace I/O for a single executor offload.
mkdir parent + atomic temp-write + rename + stat, mirroring
``_write_file_sync``. Used by edit_yaml_config(action="replace_file").
"""
target_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
tmp_file = target_file.with_suffix(".tmp")
tmp_file.write_text(content)
os.replace(str(tmp_file), str(target_file))
stat = target_file.stat()
return {"size": stat.st_size, "mtime": stat.st_mtime}
# Pre-#1579 YAML backups live here (config-root dotdir, never under www/ —
# GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf). New writes no longer land here; these are read-only
# historical artifacts surfaced through the shared edits-backup interface.
_LEGACY_BACKUP_DIRNAME = ".ha_mcp_tools_backups"
# Legacy .bak filename shape: "<safe_name>.<YYYYMMDD>_<HHMMSS>.bak", where
# safe_name = os.path.normpath(rel_path).replace(os.sep, "_") and the timestamp
# is strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S") (the pre-#1579 component-side naming).
_LEGACY_BACKUP_RE = re.compile(r"^(?P<safe>.+)\.(?P<date>\d{8})_(?P<time>\d{6})\.bak$")
def _decode_legacy_backup_name(filename: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort inverse of the legacy .bak naming.
Returns ``{file_path, timestamp, path_ambiguous}``. ``file_path`` is the
config-relative path the backup was taken from, or ``None`` when it can't be
recovered. The original naming replaced every ``os.sep`` with ``_``, which is
lossy: only the flat allowlisted shapes (``configuration.yaml``,
``packages/<name>.yaml``, ``themes/<name>.yaml``) invert unambiguously. A
nested path (``packages/sub/foo.yaml``), a literal underscore in the name, or
a pre-fix ``www/yaml_backups`` artifact cannot be distinguished and is
flagged ``path_ambiguous`` so a caller never restores to a guessed target.
"""
match = _LEGACY_BACKUP_RE.match(filename)
if not match:
return {"file_path": None, "timestamp": None, "path_ambiguous": True}
safe = match.group("safe")
timestamp = f"{match.group('date')}_{match.group('time')}"
if safe in ALLOWED_YAML_CONFIG_FILES:
return {"file_path": safe, "timestamp": timestamp, "path_ambiguous": False}
# Mirror the subdir write-allowlist in handle_edit_yaml_config
# (packages/*.yaml + themes/*.yaml) — keep in sync if that set grows. A
# pattern outside this list just stays path_ambiguous (still listable/
# readable), so drift degrades safely rather than mis-restoring.
for prefix in ("packages", "themes"):
if safe.startswith(f"{prefix}_"):
rest = safe.removeprefix(f"{prefix}_")
return {
"file_path": f"{prefix}/{rest}",
"timestamp": timestamp,
# A remaining "_" is either a literal char or a collapsed nested
# separator — indistinguishable, so the decode can't be trusted.
"path_ambiguous": "_" in rest,
}
return {"file_path": None, "timestamp": timestamp, "path_ambiguous": True}
def _list_legacy_backups_sync(legacy_dir: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Enumerate regular ``.bak`` files in the legacy backup dir (no recursion).
Skips directories, symlinks, and non-``.bak`` strays (mirrors the GHSA
migration's filter). Newest first by mtime.
"""
if not legacy_dir.is_dir():
return []
backups: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in legacy_dir.iterdir():
if not item.is_file() or item.is_symlink() or item.suffix != ".bak":
continue
stat = item.stat()
decoded = _decode_legacy_backup_name(item.name)
backups.append(
{
"filename": item.name,
"file_path": decoded["file_path"],
"path_ambiguous": decoded["path_ambiguous"],
"timestamp": decoded["timestamp"],
"size": stat.st_size,
"modified": stat.st_mtime,
}
)
backups.sort(key=lambda backup: backup["modified"], reverse=True)
return backups
def _read_legacy_backup_sync(target_file: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Read a single legacy ``.bak`` file (text) for one executor offload.
Rejects symlinks up front (defense-in-depth for this surface), then reuses
``_read_file_sync`` for the exists/is_file/stat/read.
"""
if target_file.is_symlink():
return {"_error": "not_a_file"}
return _read_file_sync(target_file)
async def _run_config_check(hass: HomeAssistant, rel_path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate the whole HA config after a write and return fields to merge
into the write response.
Uses ``async_check_ha_config_file``, which returns an error string when the
resulting config is invalid (and ``None`` when it is valid). The
``homeassistant.check_config`` *service* is deliberately not used: it is
registered with ``SupportsResponse.NONE`` and signals errors only by
raising, so a response-returning call to it always failed and the check
never actually ran (#1660).
Never raises: a check that cannot run surfaces as
``config_check: "unavailable"`` rather than failing an already-completed
write.
"""
try:
errors = await async_check_ha_config_file(hass)
except Exception as check_err:
_LOGGER.warning(
"Config check unavailable after editing %s: %s", rel_path, check_err
)
return {"config_check": "unavailable", "config_check_error": str(check_err)}
if errors:
_LOGGER.warning(
"Config check found errors after editing %s: %s", rel_path, errors
)
return {"config_check": "errors", "config_check_errors": errors}
return {"config_check": "ok"}
async def _classify_edit_yaml_target(
hass: HomeAssistant, rel_path: str, normalized: str
) -> tuple[bool, bool, dict[str, Any] | None]:
"""Validate the edit target path and classify it as package/theme.
Returns (is_package, is_theme, error). On rejection the bools are False and
error is the response dict; on success error is None.
"""
# Validate file path — only configuration.yaml, packages/*.yaml, and themes/*.yaml
if normalized.startswith("..") or normalized.startswith("/"):
return (
False,
False,
{
"success": False,
"error": "Path traversal is not allowed.",
},
)
is_config_yaml = normalized in ALLOWED_YAML_CONFIG_FILES
is_theme = fnmatch.fnmatch(normalized, "themes/*.yaml")
# Package files may live under any folder the user binds via
# ``homeassistant: packages: !include_dir_named <folder>`` — not just the
# default ``packages`` (issue #1854). The configured folder(s) are
# detected at runtime (parsing configuration.yaml), so only do that work
# when the target isn't already a config-root or theme file. The set
# always includes ``"packages"`` as a fallback.
package_dirs: set[str] = set()
is_package = False
if not is_config_yaml and not is_theme:
package_dirs = await _detect_package_dirs(hass)
is_package = _path_in_package_dir(normalized, package_dirs)
if not is_config_yaml and not is_package and not is_theme:
allowed_pkg = ", ".join(f"{folder}/*.yaml" for folder in sorted(package_dirs))
return (
False,
False,
{
"success": False,
"error": (
f"File '{rel_path}' is not allowed. "
f"Only {', '.join(ALLOWED_YAML_CONFIG_FILES)}, {allowed_pkg}, and themes/*.yaml are supported."
),
},
)
return is_package, is_theme, None
def _check_edit_yaml_containment(
config_dir: Path, rel_path: str, normalized: str, is_theme: bool
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Reject an edit target that escapes the config dir or is a hidden theme path."""
# Symlink-safe containment (parity with the read path, issue #1586): the
# write target is ``config_dir / normalized``, so a package/theme folder
# that is (or contains) a symlink escaping the config dir — or a path
# resolving into the deny floor (.storage / secrets.yaml) — must be
# rejected before writing, exactly as read_file already does.
if _violates_deny_floor(config_dir, normalized) or not _resolves_within(
config_dir, rel_path
):
_LOGGER.warning("Rejected YAML edit escaping the config dir: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Path '{rel_path}' resolves outside the config directory or "
"into a protected location and cannot be edited."
),
}
# ``themes/*.yaml`` matches dot-prefixed paths (fnmatch's ``*`` matches a
# leading ``.`` and spans ``/``), but HA's ``!include_dir_merge_named``
# loader skips them: ``annotatedyaml``'s ``_find_files`` filters every
# walked directory AND file basename through ``_is_file_valid`` (which
# is ``return not name.startswith(".")``), so a dot-prefixed file
# (``themes/.hidden.yaml``) OR directory (``themes/.foo/bar.yaml``) is
# pruned and the theme never loads — a phantom ``reload_performed``.
# Reject if any path segment is dot-prefixed, mirroring the loader,
# rather than only checking the basename.
if is_theme and any(seg.startswith(".") for seg in normalized.split("/")):
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Theme path '{rel_path}' has a dot-prefixed file or "
"directory segment. Home Assistant's !include_dir_merge_named "
"skips any path segment whose name starts with '.', so it "
"would never load. Use a path with no dot-prefixed segment."
),
}
return None
def _check_packages_key_gate(
call: ServiceCall, yaml_path: str, is_package: bool
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Reject a package-only yaml_path key disabled by the caller's runtime config.
Returns an error response when the top-level key of a packages/*.yaml write
is in the caller's disabled set, else None.
"""
# Caller-provided per-key opt-out for PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS.
# Filter to the recognised set so a caller that types
# ``automatoin`` doesn't accidentally pass through; only
# actually-known keys count.
disabled_packages_keys = {
key
for key in call.data.get("disabled_packages_keys", [])
if key in PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS
}
# Per-key gate fires only for packages/*.yaml writes. Writes to
# configuration.yaml fall through to ``_parse_and_validate_yaml_path``
# which rejects PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS with the storage-mode-
# tools advisory regardless of this flag.
top_segment = yaml_path.split(".", 1)[0] if yaml_path else ""
if is_package and top_segment in disabled_packages_keys:
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"yaml_path key {top_segment!r} is disabled by the "
f"caller's runtime configuration. Re-enable it in the "
f"caller (the ha-mcp Server Settings → YAML config "
f"editing → 'Allow {top_segment} in packages/*.yaml' "
f"toggle), or use the storage-mode equivalent."
),
}
return None
async def _apply_replace_file(
hass: HomeAssistant,
config_dir: Path,
rel_path: str,
normalized: str,
action: str,
yaml_path: str,
content: str | None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Handle action='replace_file': validate and atomically write the whole file."""
if not content:
return {
"success": False,
"error": "'content' is required for action 'replace_file'.",
}
try:
whole = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
lambda: make_yaml().load(StringIO(content))
)
except YAMLError as err:
return {"success": False, "error": f"Invalid YAML content: {err}"}
if not isinstance(whole, dict):
return {
"success": False,
"error": "Whole-file content must be a YAML mapping at the root.",
}
target_file = config_dir / normalized
try:
# Write the backup content verbatim (faithful restore). Bundles
# mkdir + atomic temp-write+rename + stat into one offload, like
# _write_file_sync.
write_meta = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_replace_file_sync, target_file, content
)
except PermissionError:
_LOGGER.error("Permission denied editing: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Permission denied: {rel_path}",
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error editing YAML config %s: %s", rel_path, err)
return {"success": False, "error": str(err)}
_LOGGER.info("YAML config restored whole-file: %s", rel_path)
restore_result: dict[str, Any] = {
"success": True,
"file": rel_path,
"action": action,
"yaml_path": yaml_path,
# Verbatim whole-file write; shares the write-path response
# shape so ``written`` stays a reliable discriminator.
"written": True,
"size": write_meta["size"],
"modified": datetime.fromtimestamp(write_meta["mtime"]).isoformat(),
# A whole-file restore can touch any number of keys; a restart
# is the always-correct activation path.
"post_action": "restart_required",
}
restore_result.update(await _run_config_check(hass, rel_path))
return restore_result
async def _parse_edit_content(
hass: HomeAssistant, action: str, content: str | None, kind: str
) -> tuple[Any, dict[str, Any] | None]:
"""Validate content is valid YAML for add/replace.
Returns (parsed_content, error). For other actions parsed_content is None.
"""
parsed_content: Any = None
if action in ("add", "replace"):
if not content:
return None, {
"success": False,
"error": f"'content' is required for action '{action}'.",
}
try:
parsed_content = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
lambda: make_yaml().load(StringIO(content))
)
except YAMLError as err:
return None, {
"success": False,
"error": f"Invalid YAML content: {err}",
}
if parsed_content is None:
return None, {
"success": False,
"error": "Content parsed as null/empty. Provide non-empty YAML.",
}
# Theme content must be a YAML mapping (theme variables)
if kind == "theme" and not isinstance(parsed_content, dict):
return None, {
"success": False,
"error": "Theme content must be a YAML mapping (theme variables).",
}
return parsed_content, None
async def _load_edit_target_data(
hass: HomeAssistant, target_file: Path, action: str, rel_path: str
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str, dict[str, Any] | None]:
"""Read + parse the existing YAML file, or start empty.
Returns (data, raw_content, error).
"""
# Read existing file content (or start with empty dict)
target_exists = await hass.async_add_executor_job(target_file.exists)
if target_exists:
raw_content = await hass.async_add_executor_job(target_file.read_text)
try:
data = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
lambda: make_yaml().load(StringIO(raw_content)) or {}
)
except YAMLError as err:
return (
{},
"",
{
"success": False,
"error": f"Cannot parse existing file '{rel_path}': {err}",
},
)
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return (
{},
"",
{
"success": False,
"error": f"File '{rel_path}' root is not a YAML mapping.",
},
)
else:
if action == "remove":
return (
{},
"",
{
"success": False,
"error": f"File does not exist: {rel_path}",
},
)
data = {}
raw_content = ""
return data, raw_content, None
def _walk_lovelace_dashboards(
data: dict[str, Any], action: str, parsed_content: Any
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any] | None]:
"""Validate dashboard content and walk/create lovelace.dashboards in ``data``.
Returns (lovelace, dashboards, error). On error the mappings are empty dicts.
"""
# filename validation for add/replace
if action in ("add", "replace"):
if not isinstance(parsed_content, dict):
return (
{},
{},
{
"success": False,
"error": "lovelace.dashboards.<url_path> content must be a YAML mapping",
},
)
fn_err = _validate_dashboard_filename(parsed_content.get("filename", ""))
if fn_err is not None:
return {}, {}, {"success": False, "error": fn_err}
# Walk/create lovelace.dashboards
lovelace = data.setdefault("lovelace", {})
if not isinstance(lovelace, dict):
return (
{},
{},
{
"success": False,
"error": "Existing 'lovelace' key is not a YAML mapping",
},
)
dashboards = lovelace.setdefault("dashboards", {})
if not isinstance(dashboards, dict):
return (
{},
{},
{
"success": False,
"error": "Existing 'lovelace.dashboards' is not a YAML mapping",
},
)
return lovelace, dashboards, None
def _apply_lovelace_dashboard_action(
data: dict[str, Any],
lovelace: dict[str, Any],
dashboards: dict[str, Any],
action: str,
url_path: str,
parsed_content: Any,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Apply add/replace/remove for a single lovelace dashboard in ``data``."""
if action == "add":
if url_path in dashboards:
existing = dashboards[url_path]
if isinstance(existing, dict) and isinstance(parsed_content, dict):
existing.update(parsed_content)
else:
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Type mismatch for dashboard '{url_path}': use 'replace' "
"to overwrite."
),
}
else:
dashboards[url_path] = parsed_content
elif action == "replace":
dashboards[url_path] = parsed_content
elif action == "remove":
if url_path not in dashboards:
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Dashboard '{url_path}' not found under lovelace.dashboards."
),
}
del dashboards[url_path]
# Clean up empty parent containers to keep the file tidy
if not dashboards:
del lovelace["dashboards"]
if not lovelace:
del data["lovelace"]
return None
def _apply_lovelace_dashboard_edit(
data: dict[str, Any], action: str, url_path: str, parsed_content: Any
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Apply an add/replace/remove to lovelace.dashboards.<url_path> in ``data``."""
lovelace, dashboards, walk_err = _walk_lovelace_dashboards(
data, action, parsed_content
)
if walk_err is not None:
return walk_err
return _apply_lovelace_dashboard_action(
data, lovelace, dashboards, action, url_path, parsed_content
)
def _apply_single_key_edit(
data: dict[str, Any],
action: str,
yaml_key: str,
label: str,
parsed_content: Any,
rel_path: str,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Apply add/replace/remove for a single top-level key (or theme) in ``data``."""
# Single-key apply logic, shared by plain config keys and
# theme names (kind == "theme"): a theme file is a mapping of
# theme-name -> variables, and theme content is pre-validated
# as a mapping above, so the list-merge arm never fires for it.
if action == "add":
if yaml_key in data:
existing = data[yaml_key]
# Merge: list extends list, dict merges dict
if isinstance(existing, list) and isinstance(parsed_content, list):
data[yaml_key] = existing + parsed_content
elif isinstance(existing, dict) and isinstance(parsed_content, dict):
existing.update(parsed_content)
else:
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Type mismatch for {label.lower()} '{yaml_key}': "
f"existing is {type(existing).__name__}, "
f"new content is {type(parsed_content).__name__}. "
"Use action='replace' to overwrite."
),
}
else:
data[yaml_key] = parsed_content
elif action == "replace":
data[yaml_key] = parsed_content
elif action == "remove":
if yaml_key not in data:
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"{label} '{yaml_key}' not found in '{rel_path}'.",
}
del data[yaml_key]
return None
def _apply_edit_action(
data: dict[str, Any],
action: str,
kind: str,
path_parts: tuple[str, ...],
parsed_content: Any,
rel_path: str,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Apply the requested edit action to ``data`` in place, returning an error or None."""
if kind == "lovelace_dashboard":
return _apply_lovelace_dashboard_edit(
data, action, path_parts[2], parsed_content
)
label = "Theme" if kind == "theme" else "Key"
return _apply_single_key_edit(
data, action, path_parts[0], label, parsed_content, rel_path
)
async def _serialize_and_validate_edit(
hass: HomeAssistant, data: dict[str, Any], raw_content: str
) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any] | None]:
"""Serialize ``data`` to YAML and verify it round-trips unchanged.
Returns (new_content, error); new_content is "" when error is set.
"""
# Serialize back to YAML, keeping the file's dominant top-level
# sequence-dash style (#1720: "changed indentation I didn't ask
# to change"). ruamel supports only ONE sequence style per dump,
# so in a MIXED-style file the minority-style sequences are
# normalized to the first-detected style — that collateral is
# counted below and surfaced as a warning + visible in ``diff``.
seq_style = detect_seq_indent(raw_content)
def _dump() -> str:
ry = make_yaml()
apply_seq_indent(ry, seq_style)
return yaml_dumps(ry, data)
try:
new_content = await hass.async_add_executor_job(_dump)
except YAMLError as err:
return "", {
"success": False,
"error": f"Failed to serialize YAML: {err}",
}
# Validate the result parses cleanly AND round-trips to the
# same data we intend to write. The emitter must not alter any
# parsed value (e.g. by re-wrapping a long line inside a folded
# scalar, which embeds a literal newline in an untouched string
# — #1720); if it would, refuse to write rather than corrupt
# the file silently.
try:
reparsed = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
lambda: make_yaml().load(StringIO(new_content))
)
except YAMLError as err:
return "", {
"success": False,
"error": f"Generated YAML failed validation: {err}",
}
if reparsed != data:
return "", {
"success": False,
"error": (
"Aborted: re-serializing the file would have altered "
"content outside the requested edit (the YAML "
"serializer changed at least one value elsewhere in "
"the file). The file was NOT modified."
),
}
return new_content, None
def _maybe_build_confirm_preview(
call: ServiceCall,
normalized: str,
new_content: str,
rel_path: str,
action: str,
yaml_path: str,
diff_text: str,
reindent_count: int,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Return a preview response when confirmation is required but unconfirmed."""
require_confirm = bool(call.data.get("require_confirm", False))
supplied_token = call.data.get("confirm_token")
expected_token = _confirm_token(normalized, new_content)
if not (require_confirm and supplied_token != expected_token):
return None
preview: dict[str, Any] = {
"success": True,
"preview": True,
"written": False,
"file": rel_path,
"action": action,
"yaml_path": yaml_path,
"diff": diff_text,
"confirm_token": expected_token,
"message": (
"Preview only — NOTHING was written. Review the diff "
"for unintended changes outside the requested edit, "
"then repeat the exact same call with confirm_token "
"to apply."
),
}
if reindent_count:
preview["warnings"] = [_reindent_warning(reindent_count)]
if supplied_token is not None:
preview["confirm_token_mismatch"] = True
preview["message"] = (
"confirm_token did not match — the file changed "
"since the preview (or the token was wrong). NOTHING "
"was written. Review the fresh diff and retry with "
"the new confirm_token."
)
return preview
async def _resolve_post_action(
hass: HomeAssistant, kind: str, path_parts: tuple[str, ...]
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return the post-edit activation info (restart/reload) for the edit kind."""
# Surface the post-edit action required to activate the change
post_info: dict[str, Any]
if kind == "lovelace_dashboard":
post_info = {"post_action": "restart_required"}
elif kind == "theme":
# Trigger frontend.reload_themes to load the theme change
try:
await hass.services.async_call(
"frontend",
"reload_themes",
{},
blocking=True,
)
post_info = {
"post_action": "reload_performed",
"reload_service": "frontend.reload_themes",
}
except Exception as reload_err:
post_info = {
"post_action": "reload_available",
"reload_service": "frontend.reload_themes",
"reload_error": str(reload_err),
}
_LOGGER.warning(
"frontend.reload_themes failed after theme edit: %s",
reload_err,
)
else:
post_info = YAML_KEY_POST_ACTIONS.get(
path_parts[0], YAML_KEY_DEFAULT_POST_ACTION
)
return post_info
async def _apply_yaml_key_edit(
hass: HomeAssistant,
config_dir: Path,
call: ServiceCall,
rel_path: str,
normalized: str,
action: str,
yaml_path: str,
kind: str,
path_parts: tuple[str, ...],
parsed_content: Any,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Read, edit, serialize, and atomically write the requested YAML key change."""
target_file = config_dir / normalized
try:
data, raw_content, load_err = await _load_edit_target_data(
hass, target_file, action, rel_path
)
if load_err is not None:
return load_err
# Pre-write backups are captured MCP-side by ha-mcp's shared
# auto-backup layer (#1579): ha_config_set_yaml snapshots the
# prior key state before calling this service, so the edit is
# restorable via ha_manage_backup(scope="edits"). The component
# no longer writes its own .ha_mcp_tools_backups/ copy. (Pre-fix
# backups already on disk there stay readable; the separate
# GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf startup migration is unaffected.)
# Perform the action — branch on kind
apply_err = _apply_edit_action(
data, action, kind, path_parts, parsed_content, rel_path
)
if apply_err is not None:
return apply_err
new_content, ser_err = await _serialize_and_validate_edit(
hass, data, raw_content
)
if ser_err is not None:
return ser_err
diff_text = _unified_diff(raw_content, new_content, rel_path)
reindent_count = _count_reindented_lines(diff_text)
preview = _maybe_build_confirm_preview(
call,
normalized,
new_content,
rel_path,
action,
yaml_path,
diff_text,
reindent_count,
)
if preview is not None:
return preview
# Create parent directories if needed (for new package files).
# mkdir(exist_ok=True) is idempotent so no pre-check is required.
await hass.async_add_executor_job(
lambda: target_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
)
# Atomic write: write to temp file, then rename into place
def _atomic_write() -> None:
tmp_file = target_file.with_suffix(".tmp")
tmp_file.write_text(new_content)
os.replace(str(tmp_file), str(target_file))
await hass.async_add_executor_job(_atomic_write)
stat = await hass.async_add_executor_job(target_file.stat)
modified_dt = datetime.fromtimestamp(stat.st_mtime)
_LOGGER.info(
"YAML config edited: %s (action=%s, key=%s)",
rel_path,
action,
yaml_path,
)
result: dict[str, Any] = {
"success": True,
"file": rel_path,
"action": action,
"yaml_path": yaml_path,
"size": stat.st_size,
"modified": modified_dt.isoformat(),
"written": True,
"diff": diff_text,
}
if reindent_count:
result["warnings"] = [_reindent_warning(reindent_count)]
# Surface the post-edit action required to activate the change
result.update(await _resolve_post_action(hass, kind, path_parts))
result.update(await _run_config_check(hass, rel_path))
return result
except PermissionError:
_LOGGER.error("Permission denied editing: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Permission denied: {rel_path}",
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error editing YAML config %s: %s", rel_path, err)
return {
"success": False,
"error": str(err),
}
def _build_edit_yaml_config_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[dict[str, Any]]]:
"""Build and return the async handle_edit_yaml_config handler.
Extracted to module level so it can be tested without registering
the full integration.
"""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
async def handle_edit_yaml_config(call: ServiceCall) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Handle the edit_yaml_config service call."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_EDIT_YAML_CONFIG)
rel_path = call.data["file"]
action = call.data["action"]
yaml_path = call.data["yaml_path"]
content = call.data.get("content")
normalized = os.path.normpath(rel_path) # noqa: ASYNC240
is_package, is_theme, target_err = await _classify_edit_yaml_target(
hass, rel_path, normalized
)
if target_err is not None:
return target_err
containment_err = _check_edit_yaml_containment(
config_dir, rel_path, normalized, is_theme
)
if containment_err is not None:
return containment_err
# Whole-file replace (restore a legacy .bak wholesale, #1579). The
# content IS the entire file, so this bypasses the per-key merge — but
# reuses the path allowlist already enforced above, plus YAML
# validation, the atomic temp-write+rename, and the post-write config
# check. No new files become writable; yaml_path is ignored here.
if action == "replace_file":
return await _apply_replace_file(
hass, config_dir, rel_path, normalized, action, yaml_path, content
)
gate_err = _check_packages_key_gate(call, yaml_path, is_package)
if gate_err is not None:
return gate_err
# Parse and validate yaml_path (replaces the old ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS check)
kind, path_parts, path_err = _parse_and_validate_yaml_path(
yaml_path,
is_package=is_package,
is_theme=is_theme,
extra_allowed_keys=_effective_extra_allowed_keys(hass, call),
)
if path_err is not None:
return {"success": False, "error": path_err}
parsed_content, content_err = await _parse_edit_content(
hass, action, content, kind
)
if content_err is not None:
return content_err
return await _apply_yaml_key_edit(
hass,
config_dir,
call,
rel_path,
normalized,
action,
yaml_path,
kind,
path_parts,
parsed_content,
)
return handle_edit_yaml_config
def _extract_yaml_views(
content: str, yaml_path: str, include_parsed: bool = False
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return the subtree at ``yaml_path`` as round-trip text and, optionally,
as JSON-safe parsed data — from a SINGLE parse of ``content``.
Runs here, in the component, because the round-trip parse needs ``ruamel``
(a component requirement) which the MCP server's runtime does not carry.
Comments and HA tags (``!secret`` / ``!include``) are preserved in the text
view and rendered to their source form in the parsed view — never resolved,
so neither view can surface a secret's plaintext.
``subtree`` is None when the root is not a mapping or the key is absent
(new-key write — nothing to snapshot). Malformed YAML also yields None, but
additionally sets ``parse_error``, so a caller can tell "this file does not
define the key" apart from "this file could not be read at all" — without
it, one broken package silently reads as a key that is simply absent.
``parsed`` is present only when ``include_parsed`` and the key resolved.
"""
views: dict[str, Any] = {"subtree": None}
try:
ry = make_yaml()
# The per-thread cached instance may carry a sequence style applied
# by a prior edit's dump on this executor thread — reset it so the
# snapshot never inherits another file's indentation.
apply_seq_indent(ry, None)
node: Any = ry.load(StringIO(content))
for seg in yaml_path.split("."):
if not isinstance(node, dict) or seg not in node:
return views
node = node[seg]
views["subtree"] = yaml_dumps(ry, node)
if include_parsed:
views["parsed"] = yaml_jsonify(node)
except YAMLError as err:
# Position only, never the error text: ruamel embeds the offending
# source line in its message, which would put file content — possibly
# an inline credential — into a response this path otherwise keeps
# free of resolved values.
mark = getattr(err, "problem_mark", None)
where = (
f" at line {mark.line + 1}, column {mark.column + 1}"
if mark is not None
else ""
)
return {"subtree": None, "parse_error": f"not valid YAML{where}"}
return views
def _extract_yaml_subtree(content: str, yaml_path: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the YAML subtree at the dotted ``yaml_path`` as round-trip text.
Used by ``read_file``'s optional ``yaml_path`` to let ha-mcp's per-edit
auto-backup snapshot the prior value of a key before ``edit_yaml_config``
changes it (#1579).
"""
subtree: str | None = _extract_yaml_views(content, yaml_path)["subtree"]
return subtree
def _validate_lovelace_dashboard_path(
yaml_path: str, parts: tuple[str, ...]
) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, ...], str | None]:
"""Validate a 'lovelace.dashboards.<url_path>' yaml_path (shape 2).
Returns (kind, parts, error); on error kind is '' and parts is ().
"""
if parts[:2] != ("lovelace", "dashboards") or len(parts) != 3:
return (
"",
(),
(
f"Dotted yaml_path '{yaml_path}' is not supported. "
"The only accepted dotted form is 'lovelace.dashboards.<url_path>'."
),
)
url_path = parts[2]
if url_path in RESERVED_DASHBOARD_URL_PATHS:
return (
"",
(),
f"url_path '{url_path}' is reserved by Home Assistant and cannot be used.",
)
if not DASHBOARD_URL_PATH_PATTERN.fullmatch(url_path):
return (
"",
(),
(
f"url_path '{url_path}' is invalid. Must be lowercase letters/digits "
"separated by hyphens (e.g., 'energy-dashboard')."
),
)
return "lovelace_dashboard", parts, None
def _caller_extra_allowed_keys(call: ServiceCall) -> frozenset[str]:
"""Return the operator-configured extra write keys for this call (#1887).
``YAML_KEY_DENYLIST`` members are dropped here so they can never widen the
``allowed`` set that the generic "not in the allowed list" rejection lists
for some *other* invalid key. A direct write to a denied key does not rely
on this drop: ``_parse_and_validate_yaml_path`` checks the denylist first
and returns the categorical floor message before any allow-set is
consulted. Keys already covered by the built-in sets are harmless
duplicates and stay.
"""
return frozenset(
key
for key in call.data.get("extra_allowed_keys", [])
if key and key not in YAML_KEY_DENYLIST
)
def _effective_extra_allowed_keys(
hass: HomeAssistant, call: ServiceCall
) -> frozenset[str]:
"""Union the per-call wire keys with the component-stored keys (#1887).
The ha-mcp server passes its own ``HA_MCP_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS`` on the wire; the
component's own options flow / settings store contributes
:func:`_current_extra_yaml_keys`. Both sources are denylist-filtered - the
wire in :func:`_caller_extra_allowed_keys`, the store on save/load - and
:func:`_parse_and_validate_yaml_path` re-checks the deny floor regardless,
so the union can never lift a forbidden key. The store side is filtered
again here purely as defense in depth.
"""
stored = frozenset(
key for key in _current_extra_yaml_keys(hass) if key not in YAML_KEY_DENYLIST
)
return _caller_extra_allowed_keys(call) | stored
def _parse_and_validate_yaml_path(
yaml_path: str,
*,
is_package: bool = False,
is_theme: bool = False,
extra_allowed_keys: frozenset[str] = frozenset(),
) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, ...], str | None]:
"""Parse and validate a yaml_path argument.
Three accepted shapes:
1. Single segment in ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS -> kind='single'
When ``is_package=True``, single segments in PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS
(automation, script, scene) are also accepted. ``extra_allowed_keys``
adds operator-opted-in keys on top of ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS (#1887); it
overrides neither ``YAML_KEY_DENYLIST`` (filtered out before it gets
here) nor the packages-only restriction.
2. Exactly 'lovelace.dashboards.<url_path>' -> kind='lovelace_dashboard'
3. Single segment theme name (no dots) when ``is_theme=True`` -> kind='theme'
Returns (kind, parts, error). On error, kind is '' and parts is ().
"""
if not yaml_path or not isinstance(yaml_path, str):
return "", (), "yaml_path must be a non-empty string"
parts = tuple(yaml_path.split("."))
# Shape 3: theme name (single segment, no dots)
if is_theme:
if len(parts) == 1:
return "theme", parts, None
return (
"",
(),
(
f"Theme name '{yaml_path}' cannot contain dots. "
"Provide a simple theme name (e.g., 'my-theme', not 'my.theme')."
),
)
# Shape 1: single key
if len(parts) == 1:
key = parts[0]
# The deny floor is checked before every single-key accept branch, so
# it holds even if a denied key is ever added to one of the allow
# sets. It deliberately does not cover the theme branch above: under
# ``is_theme`` the segment names a file in themes/, not a top-level
# configuration key, so the same word carries no trust-boundary
# meaning there.
if key in YAML_KEY_DENYLIST:
return (
"",
(),
(
f"Key '{yaml_path}' can never be edited through this "
"service: it redefines Home Assistant's own trust "
"boundary (authentication, proxy/CORS handling, or "
"frontend module loading). This floor cannot be lifted "
"by the extra-write-keys setting. Edit it by hand if "
"you really need to change it."
),
)
if key in ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS:
return "single", parts, None
if is_package and key in PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS:
return "single", parts, None
# Operator extra keys widen ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS only. They deliberately
# do NOT lift the packages-only restriction: those keys reach
# packages/*.yaml through the branch above (still governed by their
# per-key toggle) and stay rejected in configuration.yaml, so the
# storage-mode/YAML-mode collision guarantee holds however the
# operator fills the setting.
if key in extra_allowed_keys and key not in PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS:
return "single", parts, None
# Reaching here means the key was not accepted. If it is a
# PACKAGES_ONLY key, we know is_package=False (the packages branch
# would have returned, and the extra-keys branch excludes them
# precisely so this guidance still fires) – emit the targeted
# "move it to a package file" guidance instead of the generic
# allowlist dump below.
if key in PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS:
return (
"",
(),
(
f"Key '{yaml_path}' is only allowed in packages/*.yaml "
"files, not in configuration.yaml. Move the edit to a "
"package file (e.g., packages/automations.yaml) or use "
"ha_config_set_automation, ha_config_set_script, or "
"ha_config_set_scene for storage-mode."
),
)
allowed = (
ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS | PACKAGES_ONLY_YAML_KEYS | extra_allowed_keys
if is_package
else ALLOWED_YAML_KEYS | extra_allowed_keys
)
return (
"",
(),
(
f"Key '{yaml_path}' is not in the allowed list. "
f"Allowed keys: {', '.join(sorted(allowed))}. "
"For YAML-mode dashboards use 'lovelace.dashboards.<url_path>'."
),
)
# Shape 2: lovelace.dashboards.<url_path>
return _validate_lovelace_dashboard_path(yaml_path, parts)
def _migrate_legacy_backup_dir(config_dir: Path) -> tuple[int, int]:
"""Move pre-fix backups out of www/ (GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf).
Pre-fix versions wrote backups under www/yaml_backups/, which HA serves
unauthenticated at /local/. Move .bak files into the new
.ha_mcp_tools_backups/ directory and remove the old directory if empty.
Returns (moved, failed) — counts of files successfully relocated and
files that could not be moved (left in legacy_dir, still exposed).
"""
legacy_dir = config_dir / "www" / "yaml_backups"
if not legacy_dir.is_dir():
return 0, 0
new_dir = config_dir / _LEGACY_BACKUP_DIRNAME
new_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
moved = 0
failed = 0
for src in legacy_dir.iterdir():
# Only migrate regular .bak files. Skip directories, symlinks,
# sockets/fifos, and any user-deposited stray files.
if not src.is_file() or src.is_symlink() or src.suffix != ".bak":
continue
# Pick a non-colliding destination name. If <name>.bak exists, try
# <name>.legacy.bak, then .legacy1.bak, .legacy2.bak, etc. Required
# because Path.rename / shutil.move overwrite the destination
# silently on POSIX, which would lose data.
dest = new_dir / src.name
if dest.exists():
dest = new_dir / f"{src.stem}.legacy{src.suffix}"
counter = 1
while dest.exists():
dest = new_dir / f"{src.stem}.legacy{counter}{src.suffix}"
counter += 1
try:
# shutil.move falls back to copy+unlink on EXDEV (cross-device),
# which Path.rename does not handle — required for setups where
# /config/www is a separate mount (Docker bind, LXC, NFS).
shutil.move(str(src), str(dest))
moved += 1
except OSError as err:
failed += 1
_LOGGER.error(
"Failed to migrate %s out of www/: %s. File remains "
"exposed via /local/yaml_backups/.",
src.name,
err,
)
# Remove the legacy dir if we emptied it. Narrow the swallowed errno
# to ENOTEMPTY (user-dropped non-.bak files block removal — fine);
# surface anything else (permissions, read-only FS, etc.).
try:
legacy_dir.rmdir()
except OSError as err:
# ENOTEMPTY on Linux/APFS; EEXIST on some pre-APFS macOS filesystems.
if err.errno not in (errno.ENOTEMPTY, errno.EEXIST):
_LOGGER.warning(
"Could not remove legacy backup dir %s: [%s] %s",
legacy_dir,
type(err).__name__,
err,
)
return moved, failed
async def async_setup_entry(hass: HomeAssistant, entry: ConfigEntry) -> bool:
"""Set up a config entry, dispatching on its entry type.
The integration serves two entry types under one domain: the ``tools``
services entry (the original component) and the in-process ``server`` entry
(issue #1527). A missing ``entry_type`` means ``tools`` so pre-existing
entries keep working across the component update with no migration.
"""
# Lazy import (matches the embedded chain's own convention in
# embedded_entry.py): keeps homeassistant.const's import surface out of
# every hermetic unit test that merely imports this package, not just the
# ones that actually call async_setup_entry.
from .install_source_check import async_schedule_install_source_check
# Runs for BOTH entry types: HACS delivers the component as a whole, not
# just the server entry, so a legacy-repo install needs detecting either way.
async_schedule_install_source_check(hass)
if entry.data.get(CONF_ENTRY_TYPE) == ENTRY_TYPE_SERVER:
from .embedded_entry import async_setup_server_entry
return await async_setup_server_entry(hass, entry)
return await _async_setup_tools_entry(hass, entry)
async def async_unload_entry(hass: HomeAssistant, entry: ConfigEntry) -> bool:
"""Unload a config entry, dispatching on its entry type."""
if entry.data.get(CONF_ENTRY_TYPE) == ENTRY_TYPE_SERVER:
from .embedded_entry import async_unload_server_entry
return await async_unload_server_entry(hass, entry)
return await _async_unload_tools_entry(hass, entry)
async def async_remove_entry(hass: HomeAssistant, entry: ConfigEntry) -> None:
"""Handle config-entry removal, dispatching on its entry type.
The server entry revokes the credentials it provisioned; the tools entry has
nothing to clean up beyond what unload already did.
"""
if entry.data.get(CONF_ENTRY_TYPE) == ENTRY_TYPE_SERVER:
from .embedded_entry import async_remove_server_entry
await async_remove_server_entry(hass, entry)
def _current_extra_dirs(hass: HomeAssistant) -> list[str]:
"""Return the live user-configured extra directories from hass.data."""
domain_data = hass.data.get(DOMAIN)
if isinstance(domain_data, dict):
paths = domain_data.get(_HASS_DATA_ALLOWED_PATHS_KEY)
if isinstance(paths, list):
return paths
return []
def _current_extra_yaml_keys(hass: HomeAssistant) -> list[str]:
"""Return the live component-configured extra YAML write keys from hass.data."""
domain_data = hass.data.get(DOMAIN)
if isinstance(domain_data, dict):
keys = domain_data.get(_HASS_DATA_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_KEY)
if isinstance(keys, list):
return keys
return []
def _build_list_files_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_list_files service handler."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
async def handle_list_files(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Handle the list_files service call."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_LIST_FILES, files=[])
rel_path = call.data["path"]
pattern = call.data.get("pattern")
# Security check. Package files may live under a non-default folder
# (issue #1854); read_file already resolves and honours the configured
# folder(s), so the lister does too — otherwise a packages folder is
# readable file-by-file but cannot be enumerated, which is what
# ha_config_get_yaml's cross-file key discovery needs (issue #1788).
extra_dirs = _current_extra_dirs(hass)
package_dirs = await _detect_package_dirs(hass)
if not _is_path_allowed_for_dir(
config_dir, rel_path, ALLOWED_READ_DIRS, extra_dirs, package_dirs
):
_LOGGER.warning("Attempted to list files in disallowed path: %s", rel_path)
allowed_display = ALLOWED_READ_DIRS + sorted(package_dirs) + extra_dirs
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Path not allowed. Must be in: {', '.join(allowed_display)}",
"files": [],
}
target_dir = config_dir / rel_path
try:
result = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_list_files_sync, target_dir, config_dir, pattern
)
except PermissionError:
_LOGGER.error("Permission denied accessing: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Permission denied: {rel_path}",
"files": [],
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error listing files in %s: %s", rel_path, err)
return {
"success": False,
"error": str(err),
"files": [],
}
err_kind = result.get("_error")
if err_kind == "not_found":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Directory does not exist: {rel_path}",
"files": [],
}
if err_kind == "not_a_dir":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Path is not a directory: {rel_path}",
"files": [],
}
files = result["files"]
return {
"success": True,
"path": rel_path,
"pattern": pattern,
"files": files,
"count": len(files),
}
return handle_list_files
async def _shape_read_file_response(
hass: HomeAssistant,
rel_path: str,
result: dict[str, Any],
*,
tail_lines: int | None,
yaml_path: str | None,
include_parsed: bool,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Shape a successful _read_file_sync result into the read_file response.
Applies secrets masking, log tailing, optional tail, and yaml_path
subtree extraction.
"""
modified_dt = datetime.fromtimestamp(result["mtime"])
content = result["content"]
stat_size = result["size"]
# Apply special handling for specific files
normalized = os.path.normpath(rel_path) # noqa: ASYNC240
# Mask secrets.yaml. Offloaded because the first make_yaml() call on a
# thread constructs a ruamel YAML instance, whose plugin discovery globs
# the site-packages tree — blocking work that must stay off the loop.
if normalized == "secrets.yaml":
content = await hass.async_add_executor_job(_mask_secrets_content, content)
# Apply tail for log files
if normalized == "home-assistant.log":
lines = content.split("\n")
limit = tail_lines if tail_lines else DEFAULT_LOG_TAIL_LINES
if len(lines) > limit:
content = "\n".join(lines[-limit:])
truncated = True
else:
truncated = False
return {
"success": True,
"path": rel_path,
"content": content,
"size": stat_size,
"modified": modified_dt.isoformat(),
"lines_returned": min(len(lines), limit),
"total_lines": len(lines),
"truncated": truncated,
}
# Apply tail for other files if requested
full_content = content
if tail_lines:
lines = content.split("\n")
if len(lines) > tail_lines:
content = "\n".join(lines[-tail_lines:])
response: dict[str, Any] = {
"success": True,
"path": rel_path,
"content": content,
"size": stat_size,
"modified": modified_dt.isoformat(),
}
if yaml_path:
# Extract from the UNTAILED text: tailing is a display concern, and
# the retained tail is both likely to exclude the key and likely to
# be invalid YAML on its own, which would report the key as absent.
response.update(
await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_extract_yaml_views, full_content, yaml_path, include_parsed
)
)
return response
def _build_read_file_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_read_file service handler."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
async def handle_read_file(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Handle the read_file service call."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_READ_FILE)
rel_path = call.data["path"]
tail_lines = call.data.get("tail_lines")
yaml_path = call.data.get("yaml_path")
include_parsed = bool(call.data.get("include_parsed", False))
# Security check. Package files may live under a non-default folder
# (issue #1854), so resolve the configured folder(s) — the same way the
# YAML editor does — and honour them here too, otherwise the pre-write
# backup snapshot (a read of the target) blocks edits to those files.
extra_dirs = _current_extra_dirs(hass)
package_dirs = await _detect_package_dirs(hass)
if not _is_path_allowed_for_read(
config_dir, rel_path, extra_dirs, package_dirs
):
_LOGGER.warning("Attempted to read disallowed path: %s", rel_path)
allowed_patterns = (
ALLOWED_READ_FILES
+ [f"{d}/**" for d in ALLOWED_READ_DIRS]
+ [f"{d}/*.yaml" for d in sorted(package_dirs)]
+ ["custom_components/**/*.py"]
+ [f"{d}/**" for d in extra_dirs]
)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Path not allowed. Allowed patterns: {', '.join(allowed_patterns)}",
}
target_file = config_dir / rel_path
try:
result = await hass.async_add_executor_job(_read_file_sync, target_file)
except PermissionError:
_LOGGER.error("Permission denied reading: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Permission denied: {rel_path}",
}
except UnicodeDecodeError:
_LOGGER.error("Cannot read binary file: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Cannot read binary file: {rel_path}. Only text files are supported.",
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error reading file %s: %s", rel_path, err)
return {
"success": False,
"error": str(err),
}
err_kind = result.get("_error")
if err_kind == "not_found":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"File does not exist: {rel_path}",
}
if err_kind == "not_a_file":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Path is not a file: {rel_path}",
}
return await _shape_read_file_response(
hass,
rel_path,
result,
tail_lines=tail_lines,
yaml_path=yaml_path,
include_parsed=include_parsed,
)
return handle_read_file
def _build_write_file_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_write_file service handler."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
async def handle_write_file(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Handle the write_file service call."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_WRITE_FILE)
rel_path = call.data["path"]
content = call.data["content"]
overwrite = call.data.get("overwrite", False)
create_dirs = call.data.get("create_dirs", True)
# Security check - only allow writes to specific directories
extra_dirs = _current_extra_dirs(hass)
if not _is_path_allowed_for_dir(
config_dir, rel_path, ALLOWED_WRITE_DIRS, extra_dirs
):
_LOGGER.warning("Attempted to write to disallowed path: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Write not allowed. Must be in: {', '.join(ALLOWED_WRITE_DIRS + extra_dirs)}",
}
target_file = config_dir / rel_path
try:
result = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_write_file_sync,
target_file,
content,
overwrite,
create_dirs,
config_dir,
)
except PermissionError:
_LOGGER.error("Permission denied writing: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Permission denied: {rel_path}",
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error writing file %s: %s", rel_path, err)
return {
"success": False,
"error": str(err),
}
err_kind = result.get("_error")
if err_kind == "exists_no_overwrite":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"File already exists: {rel_path}. Set overwrite=true to replace.",
}
if err_kind == "no_parent":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Parent directory does not exist: {result['parent']}",
}
size = result["size"]
modified_dt = datetime.fromtimestamp(result["mtime"])
is_new = result["is_new"]
_LOGGER.info("Wrote file: %s (%d bytes)", rel_path, size)
return {
"success": True,
"path": rel_path,
"size": size,
"modified": modified_dt.isoformat(),
"created": is_new,
"message": f"File {'created' if is_new else 'updated'} successfully",
}
return handle_write_file
def _build_delete_file_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_delete_file service handler."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
async def handle_delete_file(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Handle the delete_file service call."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_DELETE_FILE)
rel_path = call.data["path"]
# Security check - only allow deletes from specific directories
extra_dirs = _current_extra_dirs(hass)
if not _is_path_allowed_for_dir(
config_dir, rel_path, ALLOWED_WRITE_DIRS, extra_dirs
):
_LOGGER.warning("Attempted to delete from disallowed path: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Delete not allowed. Must be in: {', '.join(ALLOWED_WRITE_DIRS + extra_dirs)}",
}
target_file = config_dir / rel_path
try:
result = await hass.async_add_executor_job(_delete_file_sync, target_file)
except PermissionError:
_LOGGER.error("Permission denied deleting: %s", rel_path)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Permission denied: {rel_path}",
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error deleting file %s: %s", rel_path, err)
return {
"success": False,
"error": str(err),
}
err_kind = result.get("_error")
if err_kind == "not_found":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"File does not exist: {rel_path}",
}
if err_kind == "not_a_file":
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Path is not a file (cannot delete directories): {rel_path}",
}
size = result["size"]
_LOGGER.info("Deleted file: %s (%d bytes)", rel_path, size)
return {
"success": True,
"path": rel_path,
"deleted_size": size,
"message": f"File deleted successfully: {rel_path}",
}
return handle_delete_file
def _build_get_caller_token_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_get_caller_token service handler."""
async def handle_get_caller_token(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Return the caller-auth token to the ha-mcp bootstrap caller.
Admin-gated explicitly (see `_caller_is_admin`): HA's service
registry has no built-in admin requirement, so the gate prevents
a non-admin caller from bootstrapping the token. The supported
deployments (addon supervisor user, standalone admin LLAT) all
pass this gate.
"""
if not await _caller_is_admin(hass, call):
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "unauthorized",
"error": "ha_mcp_tools.get_caller_token requires admin auth.",
}
domain_data = hass.data.get(DOMAIN)
token = (
domain_data.get(_HASS_DATA_TOKEN_KEY)
if isinstance(domain_data, dict)
else None
)
if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "not_initialized",
"error": (
"Caller token not initialized — integration may not have "
"completed setup. Reload the ha_mcp_tools integration."
),
}
# Report the manifest version so ha-mcp can enforce a minimum
# compatible component version. The integration loader reads
# ``manifest.json`` once at startup; ``async_get_integration``
# is cheap and avoids hard-coding the version twice.
# Pathological-but-belt-and-suspenders: a corrupted manifest
# would otherwise surface as HA's generic handler error rather
# than the actionable structured response shape this service
# uses everywhere else.
try:
integration = await async_get_integration(hass, DOMAIN)
if integration.version is None:
# Reads as None rather than raising; an unreadable version and
# an absent one deserve the same answer.
raise ValueError("the manifest carries no version")
version = str(integration.version)
except Exception as exc:
_LOGGER.warning(
"Could not read ha_mcp_tools manifest version for "
"get_caller_token response: %s",
exc,
)
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "manifest_unreadable",
"error": (
"ha_mcp_tools manifest version could not be read. "
"Reinstall the integration via HACS."
),
}
return {
"success": True,
"token": token,
"version": version,
}
return handle_get_caller_token
def _build_get_allowed_paths_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_get_allowed_paths service handler."""
async def handle_get_allowed_paths(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Return the user-configurable extra directories plus the built-in
allowlists and the non-overridable deny floor (issue #1567).
Backs the ha-mcp settings UI's custom filesystem-directory editor.
Caller-token + admin gated (matching get_caller_token): it reveals the
filesystem layout, so it is not a public read.
"""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_GET_ALLOWED_PATHS, paths=[])
if not await _caller_is_admin(hass, call):
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "unauthorized",
"error": "ha_mcp_tools.get_allowed_paths requires admin auth.",
"paths": [],
}
return {
"success": True,
"paths": _current_extra_dirs(hass),
"builtin_read_dirs": list(ALLOWED_READ_DIRS),
"builtin_write_dirs": list(ALLOWED_WRITE_DIRS),
"deny_floor": sorted(DENY_PATH_SEGMENTS | DENY_READ_BASENAMES),
}
return handle_get_allowed_paths
def _build_set_allowed_paths_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_set_allowed_paths service handler."""
async def handle_set_allowed_paths(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Replace the user-configurable extra directories (issues #1567, #1586).
Receives the FULL replacement list. Each entry is validated and
normalized; entries that use traversal, escape the config directory, or
hit the non-overridable deny floor are dropped and reported in
``rejected``. Config-relative dirs (#1567) and the fixed HAOS
sibling-volume roots (#1586 — see ``const.ALLOWED_VOLUME_ROOTS``) are
accepted; any other absolute path is dropped. Persists to .storage AND
updates hass.data so enforcement applies live with no HA restart.
Caller-token + admin gated.
"""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_SET_ALLOWED_PATHS, paths=[])
if not await _caller_is_admin(hass, call):
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "unauthorized",
"error": "ha_mcp_tools.set_allowed_paths requires admin auth.",
"paths": [],
}
normalized, rejected = await _apply_allowed_paths(
hass, call.data.get("paths", [])
)
_LOGGER.info(
"Updated ha_mcp_tools custom filesystem directories: %s (%d rejected)",
normalized,
len(rejected),
)
return {
"success": True,
"paths": normalized,
"rejected": rejected,
}
return handle_set_allowed_paths
def _build_get_extra_yaml_keys_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_get_extra_yaml_keys service handler (#1887)."""
async def handle_get_extra_yaml_keys(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Return the component-configured extra YAML write keys plus the
non-overridable deny floor.
Backs the component's own options flow and the ha-mcp settings UI, and
is how the server reads this store to union it with its own
``HA_MCP_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS``. Caller-token + admin gated, matching
get_allowed_paths.
"""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_GET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS, keys=[])
if not await _caller_is_admin(hass, call):
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "unauthorized",
"error": "ha_mcp_tools.get_extra_yaml_keys requires admin auth.",
"keys": [],
}
return {
"success": True,
"keys": _current_extra_yaml_keys(hass),
"deny_floor": sorted(YAML_KEY_DENYLIST),
}
return handle_get_extra_yaml_keys
def _build_set_extra_yaml_keys_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_set_extra_yaml_keys service handler (#1887)."""
async def handle_set_extra_yaml_keys(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Replace the component-configured extra YAML write keys.
Receives the FULL replacement list. Each entry is stripped and
validated; blanks and ``YAML_KEY_DENYLIST`` members are dropped and
reported in ``rejected``. Persists to .storage AND updates hass.data so
enforcement applies live with no HA restart. Caller-token + admin gated.
"""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_SET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS, keys=[])
if not await _caller_is_admin(hass, call):
return {
"success": False,
"error_code": "unauthorized",
"error": "ha_mcp_tools.set_extra_yaml_keys requires admin auth.",
"keys": [],
}
normalized, rejected = await _apply_extra_yaml_keys(
hass, call.data.get("keys", [])
)
_LOGGER.info(
"Updated ha_mcp_tools extra YAML write keys: %s (%d rejected)",
normalized,
len(rejected),
)
return {
"success": True,
"keys": normalized,
"rejected": rejected,
}
return handle_set_extra_yaml_keys
def _build_list_legacy_backups_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_list_legacy_backups service handler."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
legacy_backup_dir = config_dir / _LEGACY_BACKUP_DIRNAME
async def handle_list_legacy_backups(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""List pre-#1579 YAML backups in .ha_mcp_tools_backups/ (read-only)."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_LIST_LEGACY_BACKUPS, backups=[])
try:
backups = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_list_legacy_backups_sync, legacy_backup_dir
)
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error listing legacy backups: %s", err)
return {"success": False, "error": str(err), "backups": []}
return {"success": True, "backups": backups, "count": len(backups)}
return handle_list_legacy_backups
def _build_read_legacy_backup_handler(
hass: HomeAssistant,
) -> Callable[[ServiceCall], Awaitable[ServiceResponse]]:
"""Build the handle_read_legacy_backup service handler."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
legacy_backup_dir = config_dir / _LEGACY_BACKUP_DIRNAME
async def handle_read_legacy_backup(call: ServiceCall) -> ServiceResponse:
"""Read one pre-#1579 YAML backup by filename (read-only)."""
if not _caller_token_ok(hass, call):
return _unauthorized_response(SERVICE_READ_LEGACY_BACKUP)
filename = call.data["filename"]
# Bare basename only, .bak only, confined to the legacy dir. Reject any
# path separator, traversal, or symlink escape before touching the FS —
# this surface only ever serves files inside .ha_mcp_tools_backups/.
if (
not filename
or "/" in filename
or "\\" in filename
or filename in (".", "..")
or not filename.endswith(".bak")
or not _resolves_within(legacy_backup_dir, filename)
):
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
f"Invalid backup filename {filename!r}. Pass a bare "
f"<name>.bak from {_LEGACY_BACKUP_DIRNAME}/ "
"(no path separators)."
),
}
target_file = legacy_backup_dir / filename
try:
result = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_read_legacy_backup_sync, target_file
)
except UnicodeDecodeError:
_LOGGER.error("Cannot read binary legacy backup: %s", filename)
return {
"success": False,
"error": f"Cannot read binary backup: {filename}.",
}
except OSError as err:
_LOGGER.error("Error reading legacy backup %s: %s", filename, err)
return {"success": False, "error": str(err)}
err_kind = result.get("_error")
if err_kind == "not_found":
return {"success": False, "error": f"Backup does not exist: {filename}"}
if err_kind == "not_a_file":
return {"success": False, "error": f"Path is not a file: {filename}"}
modified_dt = datetime.fromtimestamp(result["mtime"])
decoded = _decode_legacy_backup_name(filename)
return {
"success": True,
"filename": filename,
"file_path": decoded["file_path"],
"path_ambiguous": decoded["path_ambiguous"],
"timestamp": decoded["timestamp"],
"content": result["content"],
"size": result["size"],
"modified": modified_dt.isoformat(),
}
return handle_read_legacy_backup
async def _async_setup_tools_entry(hass: HomeAssistant, entry: ConfigEntry) -> bool:
"""Set up the File & YAML services (tools entry) from a config entry."""
config_dir = Path(hass.config.config_dir)
# Bootstrap the caller-auth token. Generated on first setup, persisted
# to .storage/ha_mcp_tools_auth, cached in hass.data for fast handler
# access. ha-mcp fetches it via the get_caller_token service.
caller_token = await _load_or_create_caller_token(hass)
hass.data.setdefault(DOMAIN, {})[_HASS_DATA_TOKEN_KEY] = caller_token
# Load the user-configurable extra read/write directories (issue #1567)
# into hass.data so the file handlers read them with no I/O. set_allowed_paths
# updates this in place, so changes apply live (no HA restart).
hass.data.setdefault(DOMAIN, {})[
_HASS_DATA_ALLOWED_PATHS_KEY
] = await _load_allowed_paths(hass)
# Load the component-configured extra YAML write keys (#1887) into hass.data
# so enforcement reads them with no I/O. set_extra_yaml_keys updates this in
# place, so changes apply live (no HA restart).
hass.data.setdefault(DOMAIN, {})[
_HASS_DATA_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_KEY
] = await _load_extra_yaml_keys(hass)
# One-time migration of pre-fix YAML backups out of the publicly-served
# www/ directory (GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf). Wrapped so a migration failure
# cannot prevent the integration from loading — the integration's
# normal value (file ops, edit_yaml_config) is unaffected by this.
try:
moved, failed = await hass.async_add_executor_job(
_migrate_legacy_backup_dir, config_dir
)
except Exception as err:
# Defensive: a migration failure must not block setup_entry, since
# the integration's normal value (file ops, edit_yaml_config) is
# unaffected by whether old backups got relocated.
_LOGGER.error(
"GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf migration failed: %s. Pre-fix backups "
"may still be present in www/yaml_backups/ and reachable "
"via /local/yaml_backups/ — manual cleanup required.",
err,
)
moved, failed = 0, 0
if moved or failed:
if failed:
heading = (
f"Migrated {moved} YAML backup file(s); **{failed} could "
"not be moved** and remain in `www/yaml_backups/`, still "
"reachable without authentication via `/local/yaml_backups/`. "
"Move or delete them manually before continuing."
)
else:
heading = (
f"Moved {moved} YAML backup file(s) from `www/yaml_backups/` "
"to `.ha_mcp_tools_backups/`. The previous location was "
"reachable without authentication via `/local/yaml_backups/`."
)
message = (
f"{heading} See "
"[GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf](https://github.com/homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf). "
"**Rotate any secrets** that appeared in those YAML files "
"(MQTT/REST credentials, webhook IDs, `shell_command` "
"definitions, geofence coordinates). If you version-control "
"your Home Assistant config, also add `.ha_mcp_tools_backups/` "
"to your `.gitignore` so future backups are not committed."
)
_LOGGER.error(message)
try:
persistent_notification.async_create(
hass,
message,
title="HA MCP Tools — credential exposure (GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf)",
notification_id="ha_mcp_tools_ghsa_g39v_cvjh_8fpf",
)
except Exception as err:
# Defensive: log line above is the source of truth; the
# notification is best-effort UX and must not block setup.
_LOGGER.warning(
"Could not create persistent notification for "
"GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf migration: [%s] %s",
type(err).__name__,
err,
)
handle_list_files = _build_list_files_handler(hass)
handle_read_file = _build_read_file_handler(hass)
handle_write_file = _build_write_file_handler(hass)
handle_delete_file = _build_delete_file_handler(hass)
handle_edit_yaml_config = _build_edit_yaml_config_handler(hass)
handle_get_caller_token = _build_get_caller_token_handler(hass)
handle_get_allowed_paths = _build_get_allowed_paths_handler(hass)
handle_set_allowed_paths = _build_set_allowed_paths_handler(hass)
handle_get_extra_yaml_keys = _build_get_extra_yaml_keys_handler(hass)
handle_set_extra_yaml_keys = _build_set_extra_yaml_keys_handler(hass)
handle_list_legacy_backups = _build_list_legacy_backups_handler(hass)
handle_read_legacy_backup = _build_read_legacy_backup_handler(hass)
# Register all services with response support
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_EDIT_YAML_CONFIG,
handle_edit_yaml_config,
schema=SERVICE_EDIT_YAML_CONFIG_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_LIST_FILES,
handle_list_files,
schema=SERVICE_LIST_FILES_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_READ_FILE,
handle_read_file,
schema=SERVICE_READ_FILE_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_WRITE_FILE,
handle_write_file,
schema=SERVICE_WRITE_FILE_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_DELETE_FILE,
handle_delete_file,
schema=SERVICE_DELETE_FILE_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_GET_CALLER_TOKEN,
handle_get_caller_token,
schema=SERVICE_GET_CALLER_TOKEN_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_GET_ALLOWED_PATHS,
handle_get_allowed_paths,
schema=SERVICE_GET_ALLOWED_PATHS_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_SET_ALLOWED_PATHS,
handle_set_allowed_paths,
schema=SERVICE_SET_ALLOWED_PATHS_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_GET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS,
handle_get_extra_yaml_keys,
schema=SERVICE_GET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_SET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS,
handle_set_extra_yaml_keys,
schema=SERVICE_SET_EXTRA_YAML_KEYS_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_LIST_LEGACY_BACKUPS,
handle_list_legacy_backups,
schema=SERVICE_LIST_LEGACY_BACKUPS_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
hass.services.async_register(
DOMAIN,
SERVICE_READ_LEGACY_BACKUP,
handle_read_legacy_backup,
schema=SERVICE_READ_LEGACY_BACKUP_SCHEMA,
supports_response=SupportsResponse.ONLY,
)
# Register the in-process ha_mcp_tools/* WebSocket commands (info + search)
# the server calls behind a capability gate. Idempotent, and independent of
# the caller-token gate above — HA core authenticates the WS connection and
# @require_admin gates each command (see websocket_api.py).
async_register_commands(hass)
# Entry-level finalization: pick up the #1853 rename on existing installs and
# give the tools entry a device. Both are cosmetic to the integration's core
# value; the one fallible step (the manifest version read below) degrades to
# the compiled-in fallback rather than blocking setup.
# Retitle an entry still carrying the pre-rename default; a user-customized
# title is left untouched (only the exact old default migrates). The tools
# entry registers no update listener, so this async_update_entry cannot
# trigger a reload loop — and the guard is idempotent regardless (the title
# no longer matches on the next setup).
if entry.title == TOOLS_ENTRY_LEGACY_TITLE:
hass.config_entries.async_update_entry(entry, title=TOOLS_ENTRY_TITLE)
# Register a device (parity with the server entry, which gets one via
# update.py's DeviceInfo). Tied to the config entry, so HA removes it with
# the entry — no unload cleanup needed. The component version comes from the
# manifest like the options-form version hint, degrading to the compiled-in
# COMPONENT_VERSION if that read fails so a manifest hiccup never breaks setup.
component_version = COMPONENT_VERSION
try:
integration = await async_get_integration(hass, DOMAIN)
if integration.version is None:
# A manifest without a version reads as None rather than raising,
# and ``str()`` would put the literal "None" on the device.
raise ValueError("the manifest carries no version")
component_version = str(integration.version)
except Exception as err:
_LOGGER.debug(
"Could not read the component version for the tools device, using "
"the compiled-in %s: %s",
COMPONENT_VERSION,
err,
)
dr.async_get(hass).async_get_or_create(
config_entry_id=entry.entry_id,
identifiers={(DOMAIN, entry.entry_id)},
name=TOOLS_ENTRY_TITLE,
manufacturer="homeassistant-ai",
model="File & YAML editing services",
sw_version=component_version,
configuration_url="https://github.com/homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp",
)
_LOGGER.info("HA-MCP File & YAML Tools initialized with file management services")
return True
async def _async_unload_tools_entry(hass: HomeAssistant, entry: ConfigEntry) -> bool:
"""Unload the File & YAML services (tools entry) config entry."""
# Remove all services
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_EDIT_YAML_CONFIG)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_LIST_FILES)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_READ_FILE)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_WRITE_FILE)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_DELETE_FILE)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_GET_CALLER_TOKEN)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_GET_ALLOWED_PATHS)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_SET_ALLOWED_PATHS)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_LIST_LEGACY_BACKUPS)
hass.services.async_remove(DOMAIN, SERVICE_READ_LEGACY_BACKUP)
# Drop the cached token + allowlist from hass.data so a subsequent
# setup_entry re-reads from storage (covers the reload-after-rotate path).
domain_data = hass.data.get(DOMAIN)
if isinstance(domain_data, dict):
domain_data.pop(_HASS_DATA_TOKEN_KEY, None)
domain_data.pop(_HASS_DATA_ALLOWED_PATHS_KEY, None)
return True
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